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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court in Morrison held that Section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act did not apply extraterritorially, lacking a clear
indication by Congress of the intent to do so. In reaching this
conclusion, it clarified that the reach of Section 10(b) is a merits
question, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction and stated
that the focus of the statute was upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States while articulating a bright-line
transactional test to determine whether extraterritorial application was appropriate. The transactional test completely rejected
the conduct/effects tests, which had been used by courts for
over four decades. It is now the location of transaction, not the
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location of the fraudulent conduct or its harmful effects, that
supports a claim in post-Morrison cases.
One month later, Congress responded to Morrison and drafted
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which aimed to codify
the conduct/effects tests in proceedings brought by the SEC/
DOJ. The legislation was drafted in jurisdictional language, resulting in confusion over whether this enactment had any effect
since Morrison concluded that courts already have jurisdiction
over violations under the Exchange Act and that a clear indication by Congress of extraterritorial application was needed,
none of which Dodd-Frank demonstrated.
The solution would be to amend the statute to include a clear
indication of congressional intent to apply Section 10(b) extraterritorially. But even if congressional intent was clear, does
the jurisdictional wording of 929P(b) render that intent meaningless? Absolutely. The intent has no effect since a jurisdictional statute can do no more than confer jurisdiction. It
appears the solution would be not only to address the congressional intent but also to redraft the language of the statute to
geographically reach the substance of the transaction. But what
would we be left with? – the conduct/effects tests that have
been urged as unpredictable, poorly formulated, arbitrary, and
confusing. Thus, the optimal solution is a statutory amendment
to 929P(b) that includes a clear indication and an alternative
standard.
This study promotes a new approach, a reformulated standard
for determining the extraterritoriality of U.S. federal securities
laws: the sustainable-domestic-integrity standard. This standard
will (1) substantively reach the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act; (2) guide courts with a clear indication of congressional intent; (3) provide a private cause of action for U.S.
claimants; and (4) vest the SEC/DOJ with the responsibility of
initiating enforcement proceedings against any defendant (domestic or foreign) with conduct/effects in the United States for
injury reasonable likely upon U.S. investors, U.S. capital markets, or the integrity of the territory of the United States. This
approach serves to preserve international comity and promote
global cooperation in securities regulation.
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INTRODUCTION: AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION
Regulation under and enforcement of Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act,1 especially where the interests of other sovereigns are concerned,
can present problems when our branches of government create inconsistencies in applying U.S. securities law abroad, as this introduction
demonstrates.
What are lower courts to do when the Supreme Court makes one ruling
that “Courts shall do X” and a month later Congress enacts new legislation that “Courts shall do non-X”? It seems courts should apply the duly
enacted law, but what if that law was not properly enacted? Drafting
error? Congressional oversight? Such a situation should not pose any
problems if congressional intent is clear, absent any other problems in its
enactment. But what if the intent is not entirely clear? Or what if that
intent does not even matter because the statute was improperly drafted?
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.2 and Congress’s subsequent, and hastily, passage of Section 929P(b)
of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter
Dodd-Frank)3 highlight such a situation.
Consider the following hypothetical that has yet to be encountered in our
courts: The SEC/DOJ brings an enforcement action against a foreign
defendant about a violation of the law involving foreign securities. Also,
assume that substantial fraudulent conduct in connection with those securities takes place within the United States and that this conduct directly
causes harm to U.S. investors and becomes the target of the enforcement
action. Under Dodd-Frank scrutiny,4 the suit can proceed. Under Morrison scrutiny,5 it cannot.
The solution is to address the current post-Morrison problem through a
statutory amendment to Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank. This paper proceeds in the following manner. Part I offers a background on congressional authority, extraterritorialty, and the antifraud provisions of the
1.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Rule 10(b), Manipulative and deceptive devices).
2.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
3.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 929P(b), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (with the stated purpose “to
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system . . . to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes”).
4.
“Dodd-Frank scrutiny” will be used throughout this analysis to refer to Congress’s codification of the “conduct/effects” tests in Section 929P(b); see Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
5.
“Morrison scrutiny” will be similarly used to refer to the Supreme Court’s formulation of
the “transactional” test and the statutory “focus” analysis.
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Exchange Act. It also provides a brief synopsis of both Morrison and
Dodd-Frank. Part II gives an in-depth analysis of the Morrison opinion
and the main scholarly arguments regarding the opinion’s implications.
Next, varying interpretations of Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank are revealed, including whether the provision was drafted with deliberate intent or simply a mere error. It closes with a summary of the ambiguities
that faced the lower courts following Morrison and Dodd-Frank.
Part III sets forth the arguments for and against Morrison’s transactional
approach versus Dodd-Frank’s codified conduct/effects approach. It proceeds to analogize other areas of law to the securities context to demonstrate how the judiciary and legislature have previously dealt with this
concept in other settings. It then argues that the conduct/effects tests are
over-inclusive, while the transactional test is under-inclusive. Lastly, it
makes a final recommendation for a statutory amendment to Section
929P(b) of Dodd-Frank that articulates a new standard to guide lower
courts and protect U.S. investors/capital markets.
Part IV presents the significance of the proposed amendment – the sustainable-domestic-integrity standard – that preserves the private right of
action for U.S. claimants and leaves remaining claims to the judgment of
the SEC/DOJ, who can consider international principles such as reasonableness, comity, and deference. Part IV also addresses the three main
areas to be incorporated within the text: (1) geographic scope, (2) clear
statement, and (3) standard. It then presents the actual text of the proposed draft, which reflects the three areas. Part V revisits the hypothetical under the new standard, and Part VI provides the concluding remarks.
Also, Appendix A summarizes pre-Morrison case law, the pre-Morrison
circuit split under the conduct/effects tests, post-Morrison case law, and
a graphical representation of all prior approaches as well as the newly
proposed standard. Lastly, Appendix B briefly references the results of
the SEC’s study on the private right of action.
I.

BACKGROUND: SETTING THE STAGE

Part I provides the necessary background for extraterritorial application
in securities regulation and its relation to congressional power and judicial interpretation of statutes.
A.

TWO RADICAL CHANGES MADE

BY

SUPREME COURT

IN

MORRISON

Morrison was a monumental decision that made two significant changes
to our U.S. securities legal system: (1) it held that the extraterritorial
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reach of Section 10(b) is now a merits question, not a question of subject
matter jurisdiction, which was so ardently the procedural process previously applied in courts; and (2) it overturned over four decades of jurisprudence applying the “conduct”6 and “effects”7 tests to determine the
reach of U.S. federal securities laws over acts having a substantial effect
in the United States or over acts with a substantial portion of the fraud
occurring in the United States and replaced it with a transactional test.
The newly-articulated transactional test would form the basis of U.S. adjudication of foreign claims only if there was a security on a domestic
exchange or a domestic transaction in other securities. It is significant
due to the outright abandonment of the previously used approaches in
adjudicating the same area.
B.

TRACING

1.

Background and Principles

THE

HISTORY

OF

SECURITIES LITIGATION

Congress has the power to pass statutes that have extraterritorial effect as
long as such laws are consistent with the Constitution.8 It is even possible for Congress to pass a statute that violates international law – for
example, by using its authority, though excessively and arguably violating international law principles, under prescriptive jurisdiction – even
though it will be domestically enforceable and binding.9 However, an
6.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257-58 (defining the “conduct” doctrine as supporting the application of domestic law where “the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States,” but noting that
U.S. investors need only show that material acts in the United States significantly contributed to the
harm, whereas foreign investors must show that such acts directly caused the harm); Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting, as the first
case to formulate the subjective conduct test, that “[c]onduct within the territory alone would seem
sufficient from the standpoint of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule” and thus, a statute can have extraterritorial application where “there has been significant conduct within the territory”).
7.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257 (defining the “effects” doctrine as a justification for extraterritorial application where “the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon
United States citizens”); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating, as the
first case to articulate the objective effects test, that Congress had intended the Exchange Act to
apply extraterritorially “in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities
on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities”).
8.
TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND U.S. EXTRATERRITORIALITY 36 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (“Before a U.S. court may consider a dispute, it must first
confirm its authority to do so under the U.S. Constitution and any relevant statutes.”).
9.
Id. at 37 (“The U.S. Constitution contains no expressed limits on congressional power to
create rules with extraterritorial application.”); CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 73 (2d ed. 2015) (“Under U.S. law, Congress is indeed not bound by international law . . . .”);
Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277,
2287 n.54 (1991) (“It seems well established that Congress may, if it chooses, specify greater extra-
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Act of Congress is not to be construed to violate customary international
law if another possible construction is available.10
Jurisdiction in early cases was upheld by the judiciary over foreign plaintiffs only when the securities fraud had an adverse effect on American
investors or U.S. capital markets. Some courts have required a showing
that either the conduct test or effect test be completely satisfied.11 Other
courts have embraced the notion of an “admixture or combination”12 as a
legally sufficient basis for justifying extraterritoriality of the U.S. federal
securities acts.
Securities decisions in the 1980s-90s have resulted in multiple judiciallycreated versions and standards of the conducts/effects tests in determining whether extraterritorial application was appropriate and justified.13
These different tests led to a nation-wide circuit split of different standards for determining the reach of U.S. securities law throughout preMorrison cases only to be definitively displaced by Morrison’s brightline standard.14
2.

An Introduction to Extraterritoriality

As a starting point, extraterritoriality refers to the application of a nation’s laws abroad.15 The presumption against extraterritoriality serves
to guard against this application unless there is “a clear indication of
territorial scope than international law would allow, since Congress generally is held to have the
power to violate international law.”).
10.
See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804); see also Restatement
(Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction § 205, pt. II, ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2016) (“Where fairly possible, U.S. courts construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with
international law governing jurisdiction to prescribe. Where a federal statute cannot be so construed,
the federal statute is controlling as a matter of U.S. law.”).
11.
See Dennis R. Dumas, United States Antifraud Jurisdiction over Transnational Securities
Transactions: Merger of the Conduct and Effects Tests, 16 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 721, 746 (1995)
(noting that some cases “contained adequate evidence to support the jurisdictional decision under
one of the two tests, and therefore did not require an extensive discussion of elements relevant to the
other test”).
12.
Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“There is no requirement
that these two tests be applied separately and distinctly from each other. Indeed, an admixture or
combination of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is sufficient United States
involvement to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by an American court.”).
13.
For a brief analysis of the progression of the conduct/effects tests in pre-Morrison-cases,
see Appendix A.
14.
For a breakdown of the pre-Morrison circuit split, see Appendix A.
15.
See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 169 (Oxford
Univ. Press) (2d ed. 2015) (defining extraterritoriality as “the application of federal and state law to
conduct that takes place at least partially outside the territory of the United States . . . .”).
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congressional intent to the contrary.”16 The Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction, Tentative Draft does not require a clear
or explicit statement to demonstrate this intent, leaving more room for
judges to consult context in order to determine intent.17 Like most presumptions, the presumption against extraterritoriality is rebuttable;18
however, even if it is rebutted, it may not be the end of the analysis, as
the presumption serves as a “threshold requirement.”19 An analysis of
prescriptive jurisdiction20 requires that judges first look to the text of the
statute and, where that fails to provide a clear indication of extraterritorial application, then to the statute’s legislative history, intended purpose,
and prior record of application.21
3.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)

Courts have the burden of accommodating two very important principles
in the securities context: to protect investors in the United States and to
maintain the integrity of U.S. capital markets. But, does this responsibility permit courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond U.S. territorial borders
to achieve this goal (absent congressional authorization)? The Exchange
Act as well as the subsequent antifraud section and regulation (Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5) are completely silent as to the matter of extraterritorial application.22
16.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 203, pt. II, ch. 1
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“U.S. courts interpret federal statutory provisions to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless there is a clear indication of
congressional intent to the contrary”) (emphasis added).
17.
See United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[I]n examining the statute for congressional intention of extraterritorial application, we consider both contextual
and textual evidence.”); see also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (“Congress has
not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the locus shall include the high
seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be inferred from the nature of the offense.”) (emphasis
added).
18.
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law:
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 21 (2007) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions] (“[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality can be overcome
by a finding that Congress intended the legislation in question to reach foreign conduct or
transactions.”).
19.
RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 76 (noting that additional techniques of jurisdictional restraint,
such as interest-balancing, may have to be overcome as well; if not, “the analysis ends, and the
statute is not applied extraterritorially”).
20.
See BRADLEY, supra note 15, at 186 (noting that there five bases of prescriptive jurisdiction
– territoriality, nationality, protective principle, passive personality, and universality).
21.
See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 37 (noting that this “multi-step analysis” is especially necessary with “novel extraterritorial claims”).
22.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Section 10(b), Manipulative and deceptive devices); see also 17
C.F.R. 240 (Rule 10b-5, Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices).
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Additionally, congressional intent and legislative history have been virtually silent at worst, or ambiguous at best in regards to the Exchange Act.
The judiciary has thus been charged with the responsibility for interpreting these issues. Such gaps have prompted courts to consider the principles of international law23 and construct their decisions around policybased justifications to achieve a certain result.
Even though the Exchange Act is silent on private rights of action, judicial creation and congressional acquiescence have formed the private
right of action for domestic/foreign claims, which has been utilized extensively by private litigants – both domestic and foreign – in the past
four decades.24 To determine the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b),
international law principles should be examined by both the legislature
and judiciary when subsequent statutes and interpretations have possible
implications on foreign states/nationals.25 Courts initially inquired
whether Congress intended the statute to apply to foreign individuals and
foreign conduct;26 in other words, whether Congress had considered extraterritoriality.27 However, asking courts to infer congressional inten23.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION §§ 201, cmt. l, pt.
II, ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (The Tentative Draft appears to endorse this
approach when there are conflicts of prescriptive jurisdiction: “Two or more states may have jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to the same persons, property, or conduct. Courts in the United
States limit conflicts with the laws of other nations by applying principles of interpretation based on
international comity.”).
24.
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is
now established that a private right of action is implied under § 10 (b)”.); see also Justin Marocco,
When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence
Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. REV. 633, 633 (2013) (“Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5
contains language providing for a private cause of action under the rule. Instead, federal courts have
implied it.”).
25.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 211, pt. II, ch. 2
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“Customary international law permits exercises of
prescriptive jurisdiction if there is a genuine connection between the subject of the regulation and the
state seeking to regulate”); see BRADLEY, supra note 15, at 186 (noting that “[i]t is generally thought
that customary international law imposes limitations on ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’ . . .”).
26.
See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) (Pre-Morrison
cases ask whether, “if Congress had thought about the point,” it would have “wished to protect an
American investor” under the circumstances and whether “Congress would have wished the precious
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than
leave the problem to foreign countries.”); see also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir.
1975) (“We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to be used as a base for
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners. . . . [I]t is hard to believe Congress meant to prohibit the SEC from policing similar activities
within this country.”); Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1337 (considering what “Congress would have wished”);
contra Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (Post-Morrison cases, on the other hand, look directly at the
statute at issue; “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.”).
27.
Interestingly, courts have refused to find any indication of extraterritoriality in Section
10(b), despite the definition of interstate commerce in Section 3 of the statute: ”Interstate com-
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tions is not optimal and because of the statute’s silence, most courts hold
that U.S. securities law is to be confined within the territory of the
United States.28
In securities regulation, courts have analyzed the extraterritorial reach of
Section 10(b) in terms of subject matter jurisdiction and not prescriptive
jurisdiction.29 While both concepts use the word “jurisdiction,” there are
several distinctions that should be noted. First, prescriptive jurisdiction
refers to Congress’ power to apply a rule to conduct/persons abroad,
while subject matter jurisdiction refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a
case. Second, the case can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction30 or for failure to state a claim,31 which can have different consequences shall the claimant decide to re-file their claim. Lastly,
prescriptive jurisdiction usually refers to Congress, and subject matter
jurisdiction is most likely for the courts.
Nevertheless, the difference seems to be harmless, since the analysis
used by the courts (Section 10(b) is a jurisdictional question) and the
principles of prescriptive jurisdiction are very similar. Such reasoning
implies that courts were calling their approach one of “subject-matter
jurisdiction,” while actually applying a “merits determination” under prescriptive – subjective and/or objective – jurisdiction.32 Use of the submerce“ means trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and any State, or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof
(emphasis added); see Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities
Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 679, 702 (1999)
(noting “the language of Section 10(b) is broad and is meant to cover all sales and purchases of
securities, regardless of whether the transactions transpire on an organized United States market or
not”).
28.
See Jennifer Wu, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congressional Rebuttal to the
Supreme Court’s Ruling, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 317, 325 (noting that the practice of the courts of
confining securities law within the U.S. territory because of statutory silence on extraterritoriality is
the “presumption against extraterritoriality at work”).
29.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 201 cmt. a, pt. II,
ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (defining jurisdiction to prescribe as “the authority of a state to make laws applicable to persons, property, or conduct”); see also PUTNAM, supra
note 8, at 1 (stating that domestic courts are “consequential actors in international politics” when
they apply U.S. law to cases with extraterritorial dimensions); see RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 10
(noting that even though prescriptive jurisdiction is for Congress, the courts also exercise prescriptive jurisdiction when a statute is silent and the courts “determine the reach of the statute, in light of
the international law principles of jurisdiction”).
30.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
31.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
32.
See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985 (“We have no doubt that the activities within the United
States, detailed in the judge’s thorough factual findings, were sufficient to authorize the United
States to impose a rule with respect to consequences flowing from them wherever they might appear, under the principle stated in Restatement (2d) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 17, ‘Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest
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jective territoriality principle has been justified based on conduct that
occurs within the territory of the United States (conduct test), while use
of the objective territoriality principle has been premised on the substantial and foreseeable effects within the territory of the United States regardless of where those acts took place (effects test).33
C.

ADDING DODD-FRANK

TO THE

CONFUSION

Less than one month after Morrison was decided, Dodd-Frank was enacted. Section 929P(b) was inserted as a response to Morrison and states
that the district courts of the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act – Section 10(b) –
if conduct in the United States constitutes “significant steps in furtherance of the violation” or if conduct outside the United States has “foreseeable substantial effect” in the United States.34 That standard appears
to be the functional equivalent of the Second Circuit’s “conduct/effects”
tests. The SEC was also directed to conduct a study and solicit public

within Territory.’ ”) (emphasis added); see also Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1016 (“Although the United
States has power to prescribe the conduct of its nationals everywhere in the world, see Restatement
(2d) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 30(1)(a) (1965), Congress does not often
do so and courts are forced to interpret the statute at issue in the particular case.”) (emphasis added);
see also Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1334 (concluding that “if Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with
respect to conduct outside the United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign
relations law, a United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction” and
noting that conduct in the United States “would seem sufficient from the standpoint of jurisdiction to
prescribe a rule” and that determining congressional intent “is a question of the interpretation of the
particular statute.”) (emphasis added); see also Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (noting that “the antifraud provision of § 10(b), which enables the Commission to prescribe rules ‘necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors’ reaches beyond the territorial limits of the
United States . . . ”) (emphasis added).
33.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION §§ 201, 212-13
cmt. e & f, pt. II, chs. 1-2 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (defining jurisdiction based
on territory as jurisdiction “with respect to persons and property within its territory and with respect
to conduct that occurs in whole or in part within its territory” and defining jurisdiction based on
effects as jurisdiction “with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have a
substantial effect within its territory”).
34.
Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b) (2010). The text of Section 929P(b) provides for the following
addition to the Exchange Act of 1934: (b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION – The district
courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an
action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title involving—
• (1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the
violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only
foreign investors; or
• (2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within
the United States.
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comment on whether the conduct/effects codification in Dodd-Frank
should also extend to actions by private parties.35
Section 929P(b) does not address the geographic and substantive reach of
the Exchange Act, but does demonstrate the intent, though implied, to
codify the conduct/effects tests. Also, the provision appears to partially
overrule Morrison, but not address the private right of action.36 Because
of this contradiction, lower courts have no guidance about whether to
follow Morrison or Dodd-Frank in enforcement proceedings brought by
the Commission or the United States (the SEC/DOJ). Also, even if congressional intent is clear, does the jurisdictional wording of Section
929P(b) render the intent meaningless?
Courts are now faced with a complicated issue – in actions brought by
the SEC/DOJ, should they apply Morrison or Dodd-Frank scrutiny?
Morrison and Dodd-Frank raise three important issues: (1) procedurally,
is extraterritoriality of the Exchange Act a question of subject matter
jurisdiction or a question on the merits (prescriptive jurisdiction of Congress)?; (2) substantively, should the standard be the conduct/effects
tests, transactional test, or something else?; and (3) should the private
right of action extend to private parties in its entirety, partially, or not at
all? What do courts do with such an inconsistency? Or, more appropriately, what should they do?
II.

MODERN APPLICATION OF SECURITIES LAW

Courts have taken a more active role in adjudicating disputes in securities transactions in the 1900s and early 2000s, including disputes that
extend over our nation’s borders. Part II elaborates on how Morrison
and Dodd-Frank have disrupted the trend of the circuit courts and
presents the initial reactions.
A.

CONSISTENT PRACTICE

OF

COURTS

Modern securities regulation has increased in the two decades prior to
Morrison and has been characterized by foreign transactions and foreign
35.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 929Y, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) – for a summary of the results of the study and comment letters,
see Appendix B.
36.
See Wu, supra note 28, at 337 (mentioning that Morrison separates “two discrete categories: (1) actions brought by private litigants and (2) actions brought by the SEC or the Government”
and concluding that “private litigant actions remains undisturbed”).
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actors, cleverly coined “foreign-cubed” litigation.37 Use of the conduct/
effects tests increased, as the circuits formulated either modified approaches or adopted the approach of a sister circuit. Such a trend remained constant and was not abandoned despite the sporadic skepticism
of its desirability and logic.38 However, the pattern of following the
crowd without question was about to meet its end. Criticism surfaced,
alleging that the conduct/effects tests comprise judge-made formulations
with no identifiable standard,39 the policy justifications are increasing,40
and the judge’s decisions are based on unfounded assumptions in complete disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality.41
B.

MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD.

1.

Facts, Holding, and Analysis

The Supreme Court in Morrison addressed for the first time the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. The dispute involved the application of a foreign-cubed transaction: Australian plaintiffs suing an
Australian corporation, National Australia Bank (hereinafter NAB), for
shares traded on the Australian and other foreign exchanges. NAB is the
largest bank in Australia whose shares are traded on the Australian Stock
Exchange Limited and other foreign exchanges,42 though its ADRs43 are
37.
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (defining a foreign-cubed lawsuit as a case in which “(1) foreign plaintiffs is suing (2) a
foreign issuer in an American court for violations of American securities laws based on securities
transactions in (3) foreign countries”).
38.
See AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Pshp., 740 F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984) (hesitating regarding the application of U.S. securities laws to transactions partly in the United States and
partly abroad, but noting that “[i]n view of the established jurisprudence of this circuit, we feel
constrained to do likewise”).
39.
See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1081 (2010) (stating that the
federal courts’ adoption of the conduct and effects tests in the area of securities regulation have been
“premised on judicial guesses as to whether federal courts should exercise jurisdiction . . .”); see
Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need For The Clear
and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
89, 107 (2003) (noting that the problem is that courts apply U.S. securities laws abroad on an “ad
hoc judicial decision-making basis, not by clear rules that the legislative or executive branches have
formulated”).
40.
See Reuveni, supra note 39, at 1082 (stating that the “invocation of these policy concerns
has led to the expansion of the effects and conduct tests far beyond their original bounds, causing
much of the confusion, inconsistency, and lack of predictability inherent in modern jurisdictional
analysis of the 1934 Act”).
41.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 248 (“This disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality has occurred over many decades in many courts of appeals and has produced a collection of tests
for divining congressional intent that are complex in formulation and unpredictable in application.”).
42.
Id. at 251.
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listed on the NYSE. In 1998, NAB acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc.
(hereinafter HomeSide), a mortgage servicing company in Florida.44
From 1998 until 2001, NAB’s annual reports displayed the success of
HomeSide, which also appeared in NAB’s public statements.45
In 2001, NAB announced a write-down of the value of HomeSide’s assets by $450 million and another write-down of $1.75 billion about two
months later.46 A class of foreign purchasers of NAB’s shares filed suit
against NAB, HomeSide, and some of its directors/officers for violations
of the Exchange Act of 1934, including Rule 10b-5, as promulgated by
Section 10(b).47 The plaintiffs alleged that NAB’s U.S. subsidiary,
HomeSide, had fraudulently manipulated its internal financial records to
inflate its earnings and make its business appear more valuable and that
NAB was aware of the fraud and did nothing.48
The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that HomeSide’s alleged conduct “amounts to, at most, a link in
the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated
abroad.”49 The Second Circuit affirmed that there is no subject matter
jurisdiction because the alleged financial manipulation by HomeSide was
not the “heart of the alleged fraud;” the conduct in Australia was more
central.50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
43.
See Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. N.J. 2002) (noting that
ADRs are “financial instruments that allow investors in the United States to purchase and sell stock
in foreign corporations in a simpler and more secure manner than trading in the underlying security
in a foreign market”).
44.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 251 (HomeSide receives fees for servicing mortgages and records
the present value of the rights to receive such fees based on likelihood of repayment, the resulting
values of which are recorded by HomeSide, appear in NAB’s financial statements, and subsequently
promulgated in NAB’s annual public consolidated financial statements.).
45.
Id. at 251-52.
46.
Id. at 252 (NAB attempted to justify the write-down as a “failure to anticipate the lowering
of prevailing interest rates,” “mistaken assumptions,” and “loss of goodwill.”).
47.
Id. at 252-53 n.1 (Note: “Robert Morrison, an American investor in National’s ADRs, also
brought suit, but his claims were dismissed by the District Court because he failed to allege damages.” “Inexplicably, Morrison continued to be listed as a petitioner in the Court of Appeals and
here.”).
48.
Id. at 252.
49.
In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162, at *8, 25 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 2006).
50.
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (finding that the manipulation was not the “heart of the alleged fraud” by also concluding
the following three factors: (1) the conduct in Australia was significantly more central than those in
Florida, (2) there was no allegation that the alleged fraud “affected American investors or America’s
capital markets,” and (3) the “lengthy chain of causation” between the manipulation and the harm
was too attenuated).
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In affirming the dismissal, the Supreme Court sought to clarify two issues: (1) the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b); and (2) the standard
used to analyze extraterritorial application of U.S. law. While the briefs
for both the petitioners51 and respondents52 were impressive, the Supreme Court did not necessarily rely on any argument – in its entirety –
advanced by either party. Instead, it provided guidance on the procedure
to be used and articulated a new substantive standard to follow in statutory extraterritoriality analyses in the context of securities regulation.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first addressed the procedural
matter and clarified that the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) is a
merits question since extraterritoriality concerns inquiries into the facts
and circumstances of the transaction – the foreign conduct, and not the
power to hear the case.53 First, Justice Scalia went through an analysis
of statutory construction, reciting the most important principles that legislation, unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territory of the United States and that Congress ordinarily legislates with
respect to domestic matters.54 “When a statute gives no clear indication
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”55
Next, Justice Scalia criticized the Second Circuit’s approach of discerning what Congress would have wanted when a statute is silent and noted
that this approach has led to a “collection of tests” both “complex in
formulation and unpredictable in application.”56 Justice Scalia saw that
51.
Brief for Petitioners at 23, 29, 33, 45, 48, 53, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5257, at *35. Petitioners, plaintiffs in Morrison, relied
primarily on the following arguments: the complaint was improperly dismissed solely on grounds of
subject matter jurisdiction, petitioners had asserted jurisdiction because the Exchange Act applies to
foreign commerce, and applying U.S. law to conduct committed in the United States comports with
sovereignty, territoriality, does not offend foreign relations, and is consistent with international
comity.
52.
Brief for Respondents at 42-43, 47, 68, 88, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S.
247 (2010) (No. 08-1191), 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5257, at *149. Respondents, NAB, advanced the
following arguments: the presumption against extraterritoriality bars foreign-cubed claims, the presumption requires a clear statement for which Congress had not provided, application of U.S. law
would interfere with the sovereign authority of other nations, and the purchaser-seller requirement of
the private right of action requires that the plaintiffs had purchased or sold in the United States.
53.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254 (“But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question” and not one of subject matter jurisdiction since
the “District Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the question whether
§ 10(b) applies to National’s conduct.”).
54.
Id. at 255.
55.
Id.; EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 381-82 (Duncan Fairgrieve & Eva
Lein eds., Oxford Univ. Press) (2012) (noting that the minority opinion stated that there was jurisdiction to prescribe and Congress had properly exercised it, while the majority opinion stated that even
if there had been jurisdiction to prescribe, Congress had not exercised it).
56.
Id. at 256.
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practice as a repudiation and disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality and seized the opportunity to revitalize it in all cases to
avoid the “judicial-speculation-made-law.”57
He also compared § 10(b) to § 30(a), which did contain a “clear statement of extraterritorial effect” by explicitly referring to exchanges “not
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”58 He used this
comparison to conclude that the specific provision of extraterritorial application in § 30(a) would be superfluous if the entire Exchange Act applied to foreign transactions.59 Thus, since § 10(b) lacks this explicit
language, the presumption had not been rebutted; “there is no affirmative
indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b) applies extraterritorially, and
we therefore conclude that it does not.”60
The plaintiffs next argued that, even if the statute does not apply extraterritorially, U.S. law should still apply in this case because the deceptive
conduct occurred in Florida by HomeSide.61 In rejecting that argument,
Justice Scalia noted that most cases do involve some contact with the
United States, otherwise the presumption would be useless.62 The Court
analyzed the “focus,” or “objects of the statute’s solicitude,” as the pivotal question and found that the “focus of the Exchange Act is not upon
the place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.”63 Thus, Section 10(b) applies only to
“securities listed on domestic exchanges” and “domestic transactions in
other securities,” while excluding the location of the foreign transaction,
“absent regulations by the Commission;”64 thus, the transactional test
was articulated.
57.
Id. at 261 (“Rather than guess anew in each case, this Court applies the presumption in all
cases, preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable
effects.”).
58.
Id. at 264.
59.
Id. at 265.
60.
Id.; see also EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS, supra note 55, at 383 (concluding that in interpreting whether Congress intended Section 10(b) to have some transnational or
extraterritorial effect, the minority opinion would have found such intent; the majority opinion refused to).
61.
Id. at 266.
62.
Id. (“For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all contact with
the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a
craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in
the case.”).
63.
Id. at 266-67 (“Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only deceptive conduct ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered.’ ”) (emphasis added).
64.
Id. at 667-68.
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In developing the appropriate standard, Scalia formulated the “transactional test” to prevent “interference with foreign securities regulation”
and provide a “clear test” to avoid such interference.65 While the conduct/effects tests were the “north star of the Second Circuit’s §10(b) jurisprudence,” they were also “not easy to administer,” “not necessarily
dispositive in future cases,” viewed as “resolving matters of policy,” and
constituted an “unpredictable and inconsistent application of § 10(b) to
transnational cases.”66 The transactional test would purportedly avoid
these consequences. The majority concluded that the case at bar “involve[d] no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all aspects of
the purchases complained of by those petitioners who still have live
claims occurred outside the United States.”67 Thus, § 10(b) does not apply extraterritorially and the dismissal was affirmed.68
Justice Breyer wrote a short concurrence, where he simplified the
Court’s reasoning and noted that such a lengthy analysis was not necessary because the securities were not registered on a domestic exchange
and the purchases occurred in Australia.69 Thus, Justice Breyer noted,
while some statutes such as mail fraud or wire fraud “may apply to the
fraudulent activity alleged here to have occurred in the United States,”
Section 10(b) did not apply to this case and the Court was not required to
consider other circumstances.70
Justice Stevens also wrote a concurrence, in which he, in affirming the
dismissal, noted several inconsistencies in the majority’s analysis. He
first emphasized that the federal courts have been construing Section
10(b) differently (from the majority’s approach) by applying the conduct/
effects tests and the majority’s “textual analysis” did not “warrant the
abandonment” of that doctrine and its application.”71 Justice Stevens applauded the analysis of the Second Circuit in developing the conduct/
effects tests in the absence of legislative guidance and that “numerous
cases flesh out the proper application” of each test.72 He promoted the
Second Circuit as the “‘north star’ of § 10(b) jurisprudence” that did the
most to shape the regulation of our nation’s securities laws, with the
“tacit approval of Congress and the Commission.”73
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 269.
at 257-60.
at 273.
at 273.
at 274.
at 275.
at 275-78.
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Second, Justice Stevens questioned the majority’s new “clear statement
rule” and noted that “[w]e have been here before.”74 The presumption
can be useful at “managing international conflict,” but “does not relieve
courts of their duty to give statutes the most faithful reading possible.”75
He further clarified that these cases are not about “wholly foreign
frauds,” but rather “what kinds of domestic contacts are sufficient to trigger application of § 10(b).”76
Third, Justice Stevens took issue with the majority’s “beginning and ending its inquiry with the statutory text.”77 Justice Stevens would have
considered the congressional intent as courts have always done.78 In
other words, as opposed to the majority’s clear indication requirement,
Justice Stevens would allow courts to infer congressional intent. Also,
he would have determined the “focus” of the statute to be the public
interest and the interest of investors, not transactions on domestic exchanges, as the majority found.79 His last point was that the majority
“narrows the provision’s reach to a degree that would surprise and alarm
generations of American investors” and “the Congress that passed the
Exchange Act.”80 Nevertheless, he affirmed the dismissal because the
claimants had failed to allege that the heart of the fraud either occurred in
the United States or had an adverse impact on U.S investors or U.S.
markets.81
Is there a difference between a clear indication and a clear statement? It
can make a difference when courts interpret congressional statutes. For
example, Justice Scalia’s position in Morrison was that it is not the job
of the courts to legislate by discerning Congress’s intent. On the other
hand, Justice Stevens’ concurrence suggests that the “focus” of the statement can be discerned by congressional intention, not solely based on
congressional text. Thus, congressional indication in favor of extraterritorial application is arguably supported without necessarily finding a
“clear statement” to the same effect.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Morrison’s result was correct. The dismissal was warranted because the
case involved no securities listed on a domestic exchange and because all
conduct alleged occurred outside the United States. Nevertheless, depending on how the Supreme Court characterized the transaction, it is
possible to argue that the case could have resulted in the opposite outcome.82 A result in favor of either Morrison or NAB presents (or would
have presented) its own set of benefits and consequences. For example,
had Morrison received the victory, potential conflicts with foreign sovereigns may have resulted, even though U.S./foreign investor protection
would have been at its peak. On the other hand, because NAB prevailed,
international business relationships and foreign investment were promoted; however, it was accompanied by decreased investor protection
from the little recourse that is available to U.S. investors who eventually
discover that U.S. law does not apply to them when they buy/sell on
foreign exchanges.
Some scholars assert that Morrison negatively impacts the globalization
efforts of foreign shareholders and advocates, considering the new limit
placed on the private right of action “when investor confidence is already
on shaky ground in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.”83 However,
others suggest that Morrison’s narrowed standard was necessary to prevent the over-regulation of U.S. securities law abroad and restrain the
abuse from the private right of action.84

82.
See Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
1303, 1340-42 (2014) [hereinafter Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?] (noting that the
plaintiff’s claim in Morrison failed because the “focus” was construed as the purchase or sale of
securities, not based on the fraudulent conduct); see also Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, The
Continuing Evolution of Securities Class Actions Symposium: Transnational Litigation and Global
Securities Class Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 492 (2009) (“Another court, analyzing the
same facts, might have decided the case differently and found prescriptive jurisdiction because the
initial decision to commit fraud originated in the U.S. subsidiary and took place in Florida.”).
83.
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial
Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 570, 573-74 (2011) [hereinafter
Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank] (concluding that, under Morrison, more securities
fraud may go unpunished and that eliminating the private right of action may do more harm than
good, though optimistic that this effect will encourage foreign nations to amend their own antifraud
regulations).
84.
See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 86 (A “heavy reliance on private rights of action” affects the
amount of extraterritorial litigation in the United States and “shapes the development of underlying
rules.”).
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Morrison’s “transactional” test, though extraordinary, has previously
been urged by scholars.85 Prior to Morrison, the concept of strict territorial jurisdiction based on the connection between the transaction and U.S.
capital markets has been supported because it allows both investors and
issuers to “opt-out of the domestic regulatory system” and “choose
among different countries’ securities regimes.”86 However, the problem
here is that “the cure offered (the new transactional test) is not much
better than the disease (the traditional conduct-effects test).”87 A more
restrained approach to extraterritoriality will avoid several “problematic
features” that characterize the conduct and effects test, such as the fear of
being sued.88
Under Morrison, the claimant’s nationality, the place of the transaction’s
negotiations or completion (conduct), and the location of the transaction’s harm (effects) are wholly irrelevant. Is this ideal or, more plainly,
is this fair? Also, following Morrison, what are the purposes of Section
10(b) now? How are courts to protect U.S. investors and U.S. markets
when the new “focus” under the majority’s analysis is placed strictly and
solely on “domestic exchanges” and “domestic transactions in other
securities”?
85.
See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351,
355, 394 (2010) (arguing for a “presumption against extrajurisdictional application” in which “courts
would look to the international law of legislative jurisdiction to guide their interpretation of the
jurisdictional reach of federal statutes” which “would extend to foreign actions without direct, substantive effects in the United States only where there is unmistakably clear statutory language”)
(emphasis added); see also Choi & Silberman, supra note 82, at 468, 492-93 (arguing for a brightline “exchange-based rule” that confers jurisdiction on the nation that regulates the exchange where
the transaction took place); see also Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 18, at 68
(suggesting that the best option is a “transaction-based approach” that “limits subject-matter jurisdiction under the anti-fraud provisions to claims arising out of transactions on U.S. markets”); see also
John D. Kelly, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New US Jurisprudence With Regard
to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-fraud Provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts,
28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 498 (1997) (proposing a “domestic-traded test,” in which “the
conduct analyzed is the trading of the security, not the commission of the fraudulent act”).
86.
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 208, 224, 240-41 (1996) (questioning the desirability
of extraterritoriality for securities laws and finding it “both unnecessary and ineffective” and arguing
for a more “direct approach” that educates investors and provides clear jurisdictional lines).
87.
Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test”, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 437 (2012)
(characterizing post-Morrison decisions as dependent upon how the transactional test is interpreted:
“it can either present ambiguities that are no less significant than the ones embedded in the conducteffects test or it can lead to an unacceptable reduction of the protections offered by the securities
laws to U.S. investors”).
88.
See Young Chang, supra note 39, at 91-92 (suggesting that the possibility of being sued
results from the “inconsistent and expansive” scope of federal jurisdiction and based on “redundant
and unnecessarily costly systems of overlapping regulations” of the United States).
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The analyses in Morrison depend on two assumptions in the securities
context: (1) the focus of the statute does not encompass the protection of
U.S. investors and U.S. markets and (2) the statute does not contain any
indication of congressional intent. Neither assumption holds merit.
First, the “focus” test only applies to statutes that lack an extraterritorial
indication in determining whether extraterritorial application is appropriate. If the statute directly authorizes extraterritorial application, there
should be no need for a “focus” inquiry. However, the focus should still
reflect the purpose of the statute, which is aimed at U.S. investors and
U.S. markets.
Second, even though Morrison – and the Restatement (Fourth): Jurisdiction, Tentative Draft89 – directs courts to determine the “focus” of the
statute, there are strong arguments that the explicit provision demanded
by Morrison is not necessary.90 If not accepted, there is another way
around the rigid rule. For example, if Morrison wants to promote a
bright-line test – “When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none”91 – then it must concede that if the statute has a “clear indication,” then courts must correspondingly apply it.92
A revision to Dodd-Frank providing the requisite intent will solve these
issues.

89.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 203 cmt. b &
Reporter’s Note 6, pt. II, ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“To apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, a court must determine the focus of the provision. This focus may
have a geographic aspect, such as the place of the transaction, or it may be non-geographic.”).
90.
Id. at § 203 cmt. d (“The presumption against extraterritoriality may be rebutted by a clear
indication of congressional intent. The presumption is not a clear-statement rule, and a court will
examine all evidence of congressional intent to determine if the presumption has been overcome.”)
(emphasis added).
91.
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 248.
92.
See Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads—An Intersection between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 291 (1982) (“Courts in the
United States are not free to give effect to international legal requirements in the face of a clear
congressional direction to do otherwise. Thus, whenever Congress acts within its broad constitutional powers and clearly intends that the statute in question shall be applied in the situation before
the court, the court must apply the legislation even though that application would violate international law.”).
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THE DODD-FRANK ACT: SECTION 929P(B)

1.

Congressional Intent and Purpose

99

“People don’t always say exactly what they mean. Judges and legislators
are no exception.”93 Some scholars assert that, despite confusion, congressional intent in Dodd-Frank is clear.94 A possible reason appears to
be redundancy: why should the statute be understood as purely jurisdictional if courts already had jurisdiction under the Exchange Act?95
On the other hand, other scholars have argued that this drafting error is
fatal and does nothing but reconfirm what was already there – that courts
have jurisdiction.96 Thus, these scholars assert that, because of the jurisdictional language used, lower courts should be applying Morrison scrutiny for both private claimants and government actions.97
93.
Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t
Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. Australia National Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1, 19 (2011) (asserting that a literal reading of Dodd-Frank does not reflect congressional intent).
94.
Id. at 21 (“The Dodd-Frank language apparently was intended by the SEC, when it was
initially drafted, to codify the courts of appeals approach to extraterritoriality.”).
95.
15 U.S.C.S. § 78aa (“The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations . . . or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty” created by the Exchange Act.); see Anthony
J. Colangelo & Christopher R. Knight, Post-Kiobel Procedure: Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Prescriptive Jurisdiction?, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 49, 54 (2015) (noting that even the court
in Morrison noted that “judicial subject matter jurisdiction existed under the Exchange Act’s jurisdictional provisions” in all cases, including those where the plaintiff, defendant, and transaction were
all foreign); see also Painter, Dunham & Quackenbos, supra note 93, at 20 (“Congress could not
possibly have intended only to give federal courts jurisdiction over SEC and DOJ cases simply for
the purpose of dismissing those cases on the merits.”).
96.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 16 (pointing out that courts have “undisputed subject
matter jurisdiction over complaints alleging antitrust and securities laws violations if they are not
frivolous;” however, the real question is whether “the plaintiff has a cause of action under U.S. law,
or whether instead foreign laws should apply to the dispute) (emphasis added); see also Richard
Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 208-09, 229 (2011) (“Congress passed a poorly drafted provision
that may not do anything other than confer jurisdiction that courts already have, although Congress
probably intended for it to do more,” and even if it does do something more, it reinstates the “ambiguities” and “confusion” that previously existed under the conduct and effects tests.).
97.
See Andrew Rocks, Whoops - The Imminent Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with
International Comity after Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Drafting Error in the DoddFrank Act, 56 VILL. L. REV. 163, 167, 198 (2011) (“due to a drafting error in the Dodd-Frank Act
that framed the extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions as a jurisdictional statute, Morrison
inadvertently extends beyond private rights of action to encompass SEC and DOJ enforcement
actions”).
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Deliberate or Drafting Error?

Professor Richard Painter notes at least four explanations for what Congress actually intended in Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank regarding jurisdiction: (1) Congress and the SEC simply made a mistake and that the
provision is meant to be a merits question; (2) there was a drafting mistake but Congress nevertheless decided not to redraft it due to time constraints; (3) some members of Congress intended to confer only
jurisdiction and nothing more; or (4) Congress did intend to address the
extraterritorial application as a jurisdictional question as pre-Morrison
cases have always done and to address the merits by saying that federal
courts have jurisdiction over certain SEC/DOJ proceedings.98
Furthermore, perhaps Congress thought to overturn not only the transactional test by enacting a codified version of the conduct/effects tests, but
also intended to overturn Morrison’s approach to treat extraterritoriality
in securities law as a merits question. If so, then the jurisdictional wording of Section 929P(b) would be entirely appropriate under this explanation, as Congress would have no need to explicitly address the substance
of the transaction. However, if this were the case, then the same criticisms would arise when courts try to discern congressional intent, a task
not intended for the courts.
Even though we can speculate what Congress most likely meant,99 courts
look to Congress for guidance and rely on objective and explicit authorization for reasons of clarity and caution. An amendment becomes necessary; after all, “Congress enacts statutes; it does not enact ‘intent.’ ”100

98.
Painter, supra note 96, at 200, 202-04 (concluding that under the fourth possibility, “Congress intended to reinstate the case law that had existed in courts of appeals before Morrison was
decided”) (emphasis added).
99.
Id. at 199 (“Dodd-Frank appears to include a directive from Congress that Section 10(b)
should have extraterritorial reach in cases brought by the SEC and DOJ.”) (emphasis added); see
also Junsun Park, Global Expansion of National Securities Laws: Extraterritoriality and Jurisdictional Conflicts, 12 U.N.H. L. REV. 69, 80 (2014) (concluding that the extraterritoriality provision of
Dodd-Frank does not remove pre-Morrison ambiguity but also noting that “the Dodd-Frank Act
allows the SEC to keep using the effects and conduct tests . . .”).
100.
Painter, Dunham & Quackenbos, supra note 93, at 19, 25 (“Congress should make the
statutory language in the Dodd-Frank Act say what it meant to say.”).
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AMBIGUITIES

1.

The Cases That Followed Morrison and Dodd-Frank

AND

REACTIONS

WITHIN THE

101

CIRCUIT COURTS

The ambiguities in the Supreme Court’s analyses in Morrison resulted in
judicial confusion and guesswork.101 Because the focus test has been
either hard to ascertain or too inflexible to work with, courts have attempted to formulate ways around it102 by narrowing its holding or establishing even more standards.103 Morrison’s result is that U.S. law
applies if either “the presumption is relevant but rebutted, or the presumption is irrelevant.”104 This reasoning has the effect of giving a
plaintiff “two bites at the apple” to show that U.S. law can apply to her
case.105
2.

Present-Day Conclusions

Long gone are the days that every sovereign may do as it wishes unless it
contravenes a prohibition of international law.106 By now, it is wellsettled in the legal community that the globalization of securities is inevitable;107 what continues in the debate is how to deal with the implica101.
For a summary of the difficulties in post-Morrison case law, see Appendix A.
102.
See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 592 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Displacement of the
presumption will be warranted if the claims have a U.S. focus and adequate relevant conduct occurs
within the United States.”).
103.
See Securities Regulation—Securities Exchange Act—Second Circuit Holds that Transactions in Unlisted Securities Are Domestic if Irrevocable Liability is Incurred or if Title Passes Within
the United States, Case Comment, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1430, 1437 (2013) [hereinafter Securities
Regulation—Securities Exchange Act—Second Circuit] (“While the Second Circuit’s irrevocable
liability and title transfer test may have some salutary effects in terms of making evasion more
difficult, it ultimately reflects and illustrates the same fundamental problems underlying Morrison’s
location-based standard.”) (emphasis added).
104.
Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption against Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW.
L. REV. 655, 658, 668 (2011) [hereinafter, Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality] (“Morrison’s
two-step approach is the logical equivalent of a rule stating that where the focus of the dispute is not
in the United States - as determined in accordance with a judicially crafted standard - then for U.S.
law to apply Congress must indicate its wishes clearly.”).
105.
Id. at 661 (noting that U.S. law can apply if either “(1) the case is sufficiently tied to the
United States (because the focus occurred there) so that Congress does not need to specify that U.S.
law applies, or (2) Congress indicated sufficiently and unambiguously its preference that U.S. law
should apply so that it does not matter that the focus is located somewhere else”).
106.
See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 45-47 (defining the Lotus
Principle).
107.
See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We live in an
age of international commerce, where decisions reached in one corner of the world can reverberate
around the globe in less time than it takes to tell the tale.”); see also Steinberg & Flanagan, Transnational Dealings — Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 INT’L LAW. 829, 865 (2012) (“With the
globalization of finance and business markets, ascertaining the requisite U.S. nexus under an appli-
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tions of the phenomenon that “turn[ed] § 10(b) jurisprudence (and the
presumption against extraterritoriality) on its head.”108 So much for that
“legislative acorn”109 long ago and the efforts of the “Mother Court”110
at fostering its growth. The transactional test rejects subjective reasoning, making policy considerations and judicial assumptions a thing of the
past.
Morrison was arguably an attempt to limit the overbroad application of
U.S. law abroad and to re-acknowledge the principle that “United States
law governs domestically but does not rule the world . . . .”111 But in
doing so, it created a type of scrutiny that may too be restrictive in that it
can deny relief to U.S. investors, interfere with the goals of the Exchange
Act, and negatively impact investor confidence.112 What is certain is that
a transnational securities situation cannot be adjudicated in the United
States without implicating the interests of other nations involved.113

cable statute will become increasingly critical in discerning the boundaries of U.S. law.”); see also
Brett R. Marshall, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.: A Clear Statement Rule or a Confusing
Standard, 37 IOWA J. CORP. L. 203, 221 (2011) (“The Morrison court attempted to address some of
the questions that inevitably arise in an age of globalization where cross-border business transactions
are essential to domestic financial activity.”); see also Gunnar Schuster, Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 165, 166
(1994) (“The internationalization of capital markets has led to conflicts, mainly in the areas of insider trading, fraud claims, registration and disclosure laws, margin requirements and takeover regulations, as well as others.”).
108.

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

109.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (Justice Rehnquist
noted, “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the growth of
10(b) actions is consistent with congressional enactment and the judiciary’s task at interpreting it and
argued that it was proper for continued judicial interpretations as would be “disingenuous to suggest
that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the
present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5” and that courts must “flesh out the portions of
the law” where Congress offers no guidance.) (emphasis added).
110.
Id. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (presumably referring to the Second Circuit as the
“esteemed panel” in this area of law in its establishment of the “conduct” and “effects” tests).
111.

Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).

112.
See Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Securities Laws: Challenges and Opportunities, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 139, 154, 156
(2011) [hereinafter Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud] (concluding that too narrow an approach
could result in under-regulation “if no country has a sufficient basis or motivation for applying their
law to a case” and over-regulation producing “jurisdictional conflict with other countries seeking to
regulate the same transaction”).
113.
See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019,
1044 (2011) [hereinafter Colangelo, A Unified Approach] (asserting that the concept that all elements of a multijurisdictional claim can be narrowed to the laws of one nation without implicating
extraterritoriality is “to engage in a legal fiction”).
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It is clear that the following points are agreed upon: (1) lower courts are
unsure on the standard to apply;114 (2) Congress will not act any time
soon;115 (3) the transactional test is more likely to be applied by lower
courts, though hesitantly;116 and (4) lower courts will continue to narrow
or broaden previous holdings based on new factual scenarios presented to
them.117
Why all the uncertainty? Why is each holding different? A plausible
explanation is that courts want justice for aggrieved parties and desire a
clear standard to follow. The transactional test does not provide relief
for all injured parties (namely, U.S. investors buying or selling securities
traded on foreign exchanges) and the conduct/effects tests are by no
means a clear baseline for courts to rely on.118 Thus, the need arises
more than ever to clarify an optimal standard that provides clear guidance and addresses the injury of U.S. investors, U.S. markets, and the
territory of the United States.
III.

EVALUATING THE ARGUMENTS IN A BROADER
CONTEXT: MORRISON’S TRANSACTIONAL TEST V.
DODD FRANK’S CONDUCT/EFFECTS TESTS

Part III discusses the benefits and potential consequences of the conduct/
effects tests and the transactional test. As elaborated below, extraterrito114.
See Reuveni, supra note 39, at 1091-92 (criticizing the unpredictable nature of the effects
and conduct tests as a “multiheaded hydra applied without reference to its original purposes” and
responsible for “confusion in the lower courts and an absence of any consistency in the test’s
application”).
115.
See SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE
RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 69-70 (2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf
(“[T]his area will be subject to further legal development in the years ahead. Absent legislation,
lower federal courts in particular will likely be called upon to resolve myriad novel and difficult
issues regarding the application of the new transactional test.”).
116.
See Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 214, 217
(2d Cir. 2014) (limiting Morrison to the facts and noting that courts must “proceed cautiously in
applying teachings the Morrison Court developed” and that a court’s conclusion “cannot, of course,
be perfunctorily applied to other cases based on the perceived similarity of a few facts”).
117.
Id. at 217 (“We believe courts must carefully make their way with careful attention to the
facts of each case and to combinations of facts that have proved determinative in prior cases, so as
eventually to develop a reasonable and consistent governing body of law on this elusive question.”);
see also John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV.
635, 645 (2011) [hereinafter Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality]
(noting that Morrison introduced “new levels of unpredictability, as lower courts try to guess what
the Supreme Court would consider to be the focus of the statutes at issue”).
118.
For a figurative representation of the various examples of actors and transactions under
these standards, as well as the newly proposed standard, see Appendix A.
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rial application of U.S. securities law raises issues of international comity, foreign relations, interest analysis, and reasonableness.
A.

COMMENTARIES

1.

Pro- Morrison

BY

SCHOLARS

AND

OTHER SOURCES

Arguments in favor of the transactional test include fear that private actions create conflict119 because too much extraterritoriality can result in
“frequent conflicts between the United States and other nations”120 but
that the transactional test would respect international comity.121 In fact,
respecting the authority of another sovereign has long been an important
aspect of comity that is to be maintained and respected.122 Some argue
that the bright-line rule provides greater guidance for investors and more
clearly outlines the potential liability for issuers.123 It also promotes
greater stability and cooperation among nations with fewer risks,124
while maintaining objectivity and predictability.125 The transactional test
is more workable for courts and involves less fact-sensitive analyses and
119.
See Kara Baquizal, The Extraterritorial Reach of Section 10(B): Revisiting Morrison in
Light of Dodd-Frank, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1544, 1552, 1554 (2011) (noting how the private right
of action under U.S. law, namely class action suits, is particularly susceptible to abuse and consequently detrimental to market power and the United States’ position as a leader in the global financial market).
120.

Choi & Guzman, supra note 86, at 208.

121.
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (defining comity as “the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”).
122.
See New York C. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925) (noting that to treat a
person according to the laws of another country rather than those where he did those acts “not only
would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the
comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent”).
123.
See Rocks, supra note 97, at 186, 198 (concluding that Morrison’s interpretation would
comport with the principles of international law by “respecting the sovereignty of nations with their
own regulatory frameworks for securities fraud and whose own markets are primarily affected by
such fraud”).
124.
See Baquizal, supra note 119, at 1582 (“[S]uccessful international cooperation in controlling securities markets calls for the transactional test in Morrison. The economic risks associated
with the conduct-and-effects test, not to mention its procedural shortcomings, outweigh its benefits.
Furthermore, the interests of American investors are not seriously undermined. Morrison was correctly decided and should not be overturned.”).
125.
See Kelly, supra note 85, at 498, 507 (noting that a domestic-traded test that analyzes the
trading of the security “provides the predictability that the global business community needs, eliminates the dubious and problematic distinctions between foreign and U.S. plaintiffs, and ensures a
more efficient U.S. securities market with greater opportunities for U.S. investors”).
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assumptions.126 Lastly, these scholars assert that Dodd-Frank likely did
not provide the congressional intent that was lacking in Morrison.127
2.

Anti- Morrison

Arguments against the transactional test include apprehension that it created more problems than anticipated such as the following unresolved
and/or debated issues: (1) mere listing (or dual listing) v. actual purchase
and sale?;128 (2) American depository receipts (ADRs)?;129 (3) swap
agreements?;130 (4) foreign-squared transaction?;131 (5) what is “domestic”?;132 (6) what if brokers/dealers are used?;133 and (7) Morrison’s applicability to other areas of law?134 In addition to these questions,
126.
See Erica Siegmund, Extraterritoriality and the Unique Analogy Between Multinational
Antitrust and Securities Fraud Claims, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1047, 1076 (2011) (arguing that adopting
an approach “depending on the particular facts, regulatory scheme, or level of substantive conflict,
would force courts to engage in a complex and costly evaluation of prescriptive comity on a case-bycase basis”).
127.
See Marshall, supra note 107, at 221 (suggesting that recent congressional amendments
likely do not satisfy “the kind of clarity the Supreme Court require[d]” in Morrison).
128.
See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Before concluding that mere listing without purchasing on a domestic exchange was insufficient under Morrison, the Court conceded that “isolated clauses of the opinion may be read as requiring only that a
security be ‘listed’ on a domestic exchange . . . those excerpts read in total context compel the
opposite result” and then found that Morrison “was concerned with the territorial location where the
purchase or sale was executed . . . .”).
129.
See EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS, supra note 55, at 411 (questioning
whether U.S. investors who buy foreign ADRs on a U.S. exchange are covered by Rule 10b-5
because Morrison did not address this issue).
130.
See Maria Slobodchikova, Private Right of Action in Transactions with Cross-Border Security-Based Swaps, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 739, 775, 780 (2016) (arguing that Morrison “did
not create a clear and predictable method of determining whether transactions with SBS were domestic for purposes of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act” and “failed to accomplish the goals the
Supreme Court sought to achieve”).
131.
See EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS, supra note 55, at 411 (noting that
Morrison left many questions unanswered, including whether Morrison scrutiny extend to claims by
U.S. investors who bought shares on foreign exchanges; in other words, whether it applies to foreign-squared transactions).
132.
See Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79837, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July
16, 2010) (acknowledging that Morrison “unfortunately does not directly address what is meant by
‘domestic transactions’ ” before concluding that it believes the securities must be solicited by the
issuer in the United States and that such an approach is “better supported by Morrison”).
133.
See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Limited v. Homm, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
137150, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010) (Before concluding that Section 10(b) did not apply to
intermediaries who engaged in the fraudulent conduct in the United States, the Court stated that the
“plain language of the ‘transaction test’ established in Morrison precludes this action from moving
forward,” but also noting the strategic and deceptive efforts that the plaintiffs took to avoid regulation of the securities laws and that “[i]t would be illogical, and inconsistent with Morrison, to allow
them to seek redress in this Court”).
134.
See Colangelo, A Unified Approach, supra note 113, at 1081 (pointing out that Morrison
left the following question regarding foreign conduct and silent U.S. statutes unanswered: “[I]f the
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scholars argue that Morrison is also susceptible to assumptions and policy-making by judges.135 Furthermore, they maintain that statutes should
not be analyzed solely by text; judges should look to other sources, including the statute’s purpose, intent, context, as well analyses articulated
by prior judicial decisions.136
These arguments assert that Morrison resulted in confusion and/or disagreement among the courts (especially after Dodd-Frank) in applying
Morrison or disagreement with the decision itself.137 The implications
of Morrison have their own set of arbitrary consequences distinct from
those associated with the conduct/effects tests138 and have frequently
been criticized as unjustified and having no basis in overturning over
forty years of case law.139
presumption against extraterritoriality applies so vigorously in the securities context, why does it not
also apply with equal vigor in other contexts? For example, why does it not apply with the same
force to the ATS?”); see also Marshall, supra note 107, at 221 (stating that because Morrison’s
holding was in the context of securities laws, lower courts received no guidance in how and when to
apply the presumption to “other areas of law and a variety of factual scenarios”).
135.
See EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS, supra note 55, at 386 (concluding
that U.S. courts may sometimes “act in a manner consistent with international comity by reading
down the meaning of the statutory language” and apply it only where a “significant and material
connection” with U.S. jurisdiction is found).
136.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (Before concluding that “there is no clear indication of
extraterritoriality here,” Justice Scalia in Morrison did in fact acknowledge that the presumption is
not a clear statement rule and that “[a]ssuredly context can be consulted as well”) (emphasis added);
see also Kollias v. D & G Marine Maintenance, 29 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has made clear since Aramco that reference to non-textual sources is permissible”; see also
RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 70 (noting that the Supreme Court has articulated a three-factor analysis
in discerning congressional intent: (1) express language of the statute; (2) legislative history of the
statute; and (3) administrative interpretations of the statute (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 285-90 (1949))); see also Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, supra note 117, at 652 (recommending that “courts should take into account the entire range of
tools they use to determine legislative meaning, including deference to reasonable interpretations of
a statute by the agency entrusted with its implementation and congressional acquiescence in longstanding judicial interpretations”).
137.
See Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd., F.3d at 217 (rejecting the bright-line test by noting the
following: “Neither do we see anything in Morrison that requires us to adopt a ‘bright-line’ test of
extraterritoriality when deciding every § 10(b) case”); see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 87, at 443
(noting that further litigation will be required to determine the scope of Morrison and that the two
most likely judicial interpretations will be inadequate: “If the decision is interpreted narrowly, the
purpose of, not to mention the practical need for, U.S. securities laws will be frustrated as American
investors lose essential protections. If, instead, the decision is interpreted broadly, the same ambiguities that afflicted previous tests will afflict Morrison’s new transactional test.”).
138.
See Wu, supra note 28, at 339 (“[S]uch a strictly geographically-focused approach, though
easy in its application, often reaches absurd and counter-intuitive results. Potential for such arbitrariness and unfairness exists under the Morrison ‘transactional’ test”).
139.
See Marshall, supra note 107, at 214 (concluding that “the Court’s reasons for rejecting the
conduct and effects tests are inconsistent with its previous decisions”).
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It is now easier for foreign issuers to structure the transaction to their
advantage and avoid U.S. scrutiny,140 thus transforming the United
States into a safe haven for defrauders and damaging its integrity. A test
that looks solely to location of the transaction is urged as too rigid and
inflexible for today’s world141 and has the possibility of not only disrespecting foreign sovereigns, but also contradicting the intent of Congress, creating separation of powers concerns.142 Such concerns are
valid since extraterritoriality is in the “eye of the beholder”143 and can be
circumvented.
3.

Pro- Dodd-Frank

Arguments in favor of the conduct/effects tests codified by Dodd-Frank
include assertions that the tests reflect economic reality, include the
unique factual circumstances of each case,144 and promote investor pro140.
See Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank, supra note 83, at 570, 574 (noting that
Morrison may “let more fraud slip through the cracks,” but at the same time may indirectly incentivize foreign nations to reform their own antifraud laws to encourage U.S. investment and cooperation in their own nation); see also Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
supra note 117, at 646 (Morrison added another decision that allows “domestic effects to avoid or
overcome the presumption”); see also Ted Farris, Implications of Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd.-US Supreme Court Limits Extraterritorial Application of Rule 10b-5 Adopting Location
Based Bright Line Test for Securities Transactions-Rule 10b-5 Does Not Apply to Transactions in
Securities Outside the United States, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, June 28, 2010, https://
www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/2010/06/implications-of-morrison-v-national-australia-ba__ (“[F]oreign issuers selling non US listed securities to US institutions may insist that those
purchasers buy their securities in an offshore transaction by a non US affiliate in an effort to remain
beyond the reach of Rule 10b-5. Conversely, large U.S. institutional investors may insist that their
Rule 144A purchases be made directly into the United States so that Rule 10b-5 would be applicable
to the sale.).
141.
See Securities Regulation—Securities Exchange Act—Second Circuit, supra note 103, at
1437 (“[I]n a world where physical location is becoming increasingly illusory, a location-based
standard does not serve as a meaningful principle for distinguishing which cases should stay in the
United States.”).
142.
See Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality, supra note 104, at 664, 667, 669, 6772 (concluding that Morrison has “diminished the importance of congressional preferences,” created a “misleading” impression that “congressional intent is the most important concern,” and thus will result in
“contradicting the result that Congress wanted” with the “indirect consequence of restricting the
power of Congress and the Executive”); see also Colangelo, A Unified Approach, supra note 113, at
1044 (“Morrison . . . may undermine both respect for foreign sovereigns and deference to the political branches.”).
143.
RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 73 (noting that courts have attempted to “bypass Congress’s
foreign relations prerogatives, and give the statute an application which in reality may well be
extraterritorial”).
144.
Id. at 40 (suggesting that “[l]egal certainty in jurisdictional matters is then not derived from
the classical extraterritoriality doctrine, but from a case-by-case reasonableness analysis”); see Wu,
supra note 28, at 340 (noting that even though the conduct and effects tests were “malleable, unpredictable, and difficult to apply,” they nevertheless allowed for “great flexibility, enabling intuitively
equitable outcomes by thoroughly considering unique factual scenarios”).
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tection and business relations.145 Defrauders cannot easily avoid liability
because a thorough analysis will be given to each factual circumstance.146 The conduct/effects tests are promoted because they recognize
the need for increased regulation in a globalized world147 and provide the
flexibility needed.148 Lastly, the responsibility lodged with the SEC/DOJ
is appropriate because the SEC/DOJ are presumably in better positions
than private litigants.149 However, the responsibility is very sensitive
and should not be undertaken where other countries have equal or greater
interests.150
4.

Anti- Dodd-Frank

Arguments against Dodd-Frank’s conduct/effects tests include statements
that the tests are arbitrary, not uniform, and largely based on policy reasons articulated by the courts.151 The tests purportedly cause a decrease
in willingness to participate with U.S. issuers and within U.S. markets
145.
See Wu, supra note 28, at 342 (urging that “from a public policy perspective,” the conduct
and effects tests “may be preferable to the ‘transactional’ test for securities litigation, given the
commonly cross-border manner in which business is conducted today”).
146.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 87, at 409 (“International disputes often defy bright-line rules
and depend heavily on the factual circumstances of a particular case.”).
147.
See Colangelo, What Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, supra note 82, at 1348-49 (noting
the “increasing interconnectedness of the world” and “collapse or merger of traditionally separate
spheres of public and private law” and urging for a reconsideration of extraterritoriality); see also
Park, supra note 99, at 69 (“As securities fraud has grown increasingly transnational, it has become
necessary to expand the reach of antifraud provisions to persons and entities participating in global
securities markets”); see also Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 112, at 140 (“With
globalization, securities markets have become progressively more interconnected, and securities
fraud has increasingly crossed borders, creating problems for national regulators seeking to deter and
punish fraud.”); see also Young Chang, supra note 39, at 90 (“As securities markets have become
increasingly globalized in recent years, the growth of transactions in cross-border securities raises an
issue of the regulation of transnational securities fraud.”).
148.
See Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 112, at 168 (“U.S. courts should be
careful to preserve a flexible approach to the question of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antifraud rules, while still screening out claims by foreign plaintiffs that are not based on sufficient
conduct within the United States”).
149.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 87, at 439 (noting that in light of Morrison and Dodd-Frank,
“[i]t is not surprising that enforcement agencies and government branches are granted broader reach
and stronger legal instruments to seek damages than are private parties”); see also Choi & Silberman, supra note 82, at 468, 504 (noting that the “SEC stands in a better position” to make determinations regarding which countries U.S. jurisdiction should extend extraterritorially because the SEC
is a “centralized decision maker with expertise on securities-enforcement issues”).
150.
See Park, supra note 99, at 82 (cautioning against extraterritorial application in actions
brought by the SEC or DOJ under Dodd-Frank and noting that “[i]f the SEC and the DOJ aggressively, abusively, or unilaterally insist upon extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud provisions
under the Dodd-Frank Act, international relations can be significantly impaired”).
151.
See Wu, supra note 28, at 328 (noting that “courts had stepped into a quasi-legislative role”
in pre-Morrison cases when determining whether the antifraud provisions should apply to transnational securities cases).
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because foreign issuers are afraid their small U.S. presence will subject
them to domestic law;152 which, in turn, may lead to less foreign capital
in the United States.
Further arguments surmise that the conduct/effects tests make it easy for
class action lawyers to maintain a global lawsuit.153 These scholars assert that the tests are too fact-specific, contain too many exceptions, are
too subjective,154 and disrespect the principle of international comity.155
B.

ANALOGIZING EXTRATERRITORIALITY

1.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”)

TO

OTHER AREAS

OF

LAW

Extraterritoriality issues have also arisen under the Securities Act and
show how courts have extended the presumption to other provisions
within the same subject matter. Opinions under the Securities Act support the argument that while Morrison’s approach may be appropriate in
some circumstances, there may more leeway allowed when the SEC initiates proceedings.156
2.

Other Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act

Extraterritoriality also plays a role in other parts of the Dodd-Frank Act
and establishes that courts have recognized the importance of the presumption against extraterritoriality in other statutes. Cases suggest that
international relation concerns are gaining more importance in judicial
decisions when analyzing whether extraterritorialty is warranted.157
152.
See Kelly, supra note 85, at 493 (noting that foreigners “do not know what constitutes a
substantial effect or what behavior abroad might affect U.S. securities” and become “wary of being
haled into U.S. courts”).
153.
See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 18, at 67 (noting that the “multinational class action practice will generate excessive levels of conflict with other countries, as well as
mounting uncertainty for litigants”).
154.
See Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 112, at 153 (“Because of the caseby-case nature of the inquiry and the lack of uniformity among courts in interpreting the conduct
test, cases with similar facts will often have disparate outcomes, without any clear indicators from
courts as to what tips the balance one way or the other.”).
155.
See Kelly, supra note 85, at 493-98 (noting the “dubious nationality distinctions,” “unfounded moral rationale,” “failure to uphold comity,” and “detrimental economic effect” among the
many problems associated with the conduct test).
156.
For a discussion of extraterritoriality in light of Morrison and Dodd-Frank in disputes
brought under the Securities Act of 1933, see SEC v. Tourre, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78297
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2013).
157.
For an example of a decision that emphasized the importance of a U.S. connection in the
claim, congressional intent, and avoiding international ramifications in analyzing extraterritoriality,
see Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2014).
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Antitrust law cases arose before securities disputes and demonstrate how
and when courts have articulated a clear statement to apply (or not apply)
the statute abroad. Antitrust law is highly related to securities laws, with
securities law viewed as an extension of antitrust law.158 For example,
clear congressional intent in antitrust statutes appears to be the optimal
approach to clarify prior ambiguities and provides courts with guidance
in resolving future disputes.159
4.

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)

The Alien Tort Statute gives a prominent example of how courts have
justified the presumption by either deference to the political branches or
respect to foreign nations.160 In relying on the presumption, courts
deemed the matter too important to have been overlooked by Congress,
thus requiring a more specific statement.161 Decisions under the ATS
reflect a general reluctance to restrictive, bright-line rules over more
flexible, fact-sensitive inquiries.162

158.
See Siegmund, supra note 126, at 1060 (noting that both antitrust and securities fraud cases
involve “global consequences that cause adverse U.S. domestic effects” but that the “core of the
argument” in both areas is that “the effects of the schemes are realized worldwide”).
159.
For an example of a statute that clarified the application of U.S. antitrust law to trade or
commerce with foreign nations (Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act), see 15 U.S.C. § 6a.
160.
For a brief discussion of Morrison in ATS decisions and how courts have acknowledged
the importance of the presumption and respect for foreign sovereigns/political branches, see Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013).
161.
Id. at 686 (While the Court quoted Morrison to explain that Congress did not provide a
clear indication of extraterritorial application, it also appears that the Court in Kiobel did not adopt
Morrison’s “focus test” in its statutory analysis and instead articulated a slightly less burdensome
“touch and concern” standard. Interestingly, Kiobel’s “touch and concern” standard sounds strikingly similar to the conduct/effects tests. For example, the requirement that the claim “touch” the
territory of the United States resembles the objective effects test, while the “concern” prong arguably
refers to the subjective conduct test. However, as mentioned, there were flaws with the conduct/
effects tests, but this appears to be addressed by Kiobel’s added requirement that the claims touch
and concern the United States “with sufficient force,” which demonstrates the demand for a higher
burden under this standard and is, thus, a more logical approach.).
162.
For examples of cases that have rejected bright-line rules, adopted a case-by-case analysis,
and adhered to judicial caution in interpreting the ATS, see John Doe I, et al. v. Nestle USA, et al.,
766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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Criminal Law – Criminal Prosecutions under Section 10(b) and
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)

Criminal law can also be subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality and provides a helpful illustration as to how courts have analogized the same reasoning in favor of the presumption from the civil to
some criminal contexts. For example, opinions decided under RICO or
criminal prosecutions under Section 10(b) appear to favor limits on private action suits but allow more leeway in cases brought by the United
States against foreign defendants based on foreign misconduct.163
C.

REASONS FOR AMENDMENT: ON
INTERNATIONAL LEVELS

1.

The Conduct/Effects Tests are Over-Inclusive

THE

DOMESTIC

AND

Consider the following oversimplified example. At a meeting in New
York, a foreign issuer fraudulently sells foreign shares to a foreign investor. Based on conduct in New York, U.S. law can be applied to this
otherwise wholly foreign transaction. As a twist to the example, if the
foreign issuer fraudulently induces one U.S. investor and hundreds of
foreign investors, the effects of that one harmed U.S. investor can justify
a worldwide class action in the United States.164 Such a situation clearly
demonstrates the need for a restrained approach on the overly broad
application.165
2.

The Transactional Test is Under-Inclusive

Now consider another example with the transactional test. A U.S. investor buys shares on a foreign exchange based on a foreign issuer’s fraudulent financial statements. The U.S. investor has no U.S. remedy under
163.
For a discussion of extending the presumption against extraterritoriality to criminal actions
and the difference between suits brought by private parties versus the United States, see RJR
Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, (2016); United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d
Cir. 2013).
164.
See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 270 (noting the abuse of class action suits and supporting a
restrictive view that would not increase fraud but would uphold international comity, Justice Scalia
stated, “[w]hile there is no reason to believe that the United States has become the Barbary Coast for
those perpetrating frauds on foreign securities markets, some fear that it has become the Shangri-La
of class-action litigation for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities
markets”).
165.
See Young Chang, supra note 39, at 120-21 (warning that “[t]oo broad a scope . . . would
do harm to the establishment of the effective and cooperative scheme of transnational securities
regulation that most countries seek”).
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Morrison solely because the transaction was not domestic. Not only
does the transactional test punish bona fide U.S. purchasers, it also rewards U.S. defrauders. As an alternative to the above example, a U.S.
investor who trades on a foreign exchange based on inside information,
making millions, can escape U.S. liability under Morrison (though presumably cannot escape foreign liability). These deceptive strategies are
likely to result in a system of under regulation.166
3.

Concluding Remarks: The Need for An Alternative Standard

To say that the conduct/effects tests are over-inclusive is not to imply
that the tests are completely without merit; in fact, such tests are practical
approaches and should not be abandoned in their entirety.167 The conduct/effects tests more clearly align to the goals of the Exchange Act and
more accurately reflect current economic reality,168 which, like the two
tests, is volatile and flexible, yet adaptable. In formulating an optimal
approach, the protection of U.S. investors and U.S. capital markets as
well as maintaining the integrity of the territory of the United States
should remain the fundamental objectives, as the “application of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws is essential to protect domestic
markets and investors.”169
The presumption against extraterritoriality is important and should be
maintained.170 It prevents the United States from ruling on other countries’ cases for other countries’ nationals and strikes the proper balance
166.
See Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 112, at 156 (“Although broad assertions of extraterritoriality risk cause jurisdictional conflict and overregulation, too narrow of an
approach to extraterritoriality will make it easier for opportunistic issuers to structure transactions
specifically to avoid application of U.S. antifraud rules, and may result in under-regulation.”).
167.
See Young Chang, supra note 39, at 121 (noting that when Congress provides clear standards, they “should not ignore the merits of the current effects and conduct tests utilized by federal
courts” as these tests have been “practical approaches to decide a reasonable scope for
extraterritoriality”).
168.
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks, Earl A.
Snyder Lecture in International Law, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 165, 177 (2010) (“Yet much
securities activity is global: companies list their securities on multiple markets, and investors seek
out foreign as well as domestic opportunities. As a result, much securities fraud has a global aspect
. . . .”); see also Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 2x2 Games of International Securities
Regulation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 61, 62-63 (1999) (“In recent years, the internationalization of securities markets has accelerated in pace and broadened in scope, due in part to advances in telecommunications and computer technology.” “The internationalization of securities markets bears directly
on American firms and individuals.”).
169.
Young Chang, supra note 39, at 120.
170.
See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 277 (concluding that with an “economically integrated” and
“territorially fragmented” international world, extraterritoriality in this area will remain an “important issue in international politics and international law”); see also Wu, supra note 28, at 344 (concluding that although there is confusion regarding Morrison and Dodd-Frank that resulted in a
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between judicial efficiency and international comity.171 Courts must afford a degree of deference to the particular securities laws of other nations and consider broader factors such as “economic policy, procedural
rules accompanying those regulations, and the spirit of that state’s civil
litigation system.”172
An amendment should begin with the exercise of prescriptive judication,
providing a private right of action for U.S. citizens/residents and tasking
the SEC/DOJ with the more complicated, foreign transactions. This approach accords with the Restatement (Fourth): Jurisdiction, Tentative
Draft and goals of the Exchange Act in assuring reasonableness when
extending U.S. law abroad to protect U.S. investors and U.S. capital markets.173 Also, case law supports a long-standing practice of analyzing
U.S. securities laws based on the “statute’s conduct-regulating rules,”
and thus falls under prescriptive jurisdiction, not subject matter
jurisdiction.174
Persuasive arguments to resolve these predicaments are frequently
presented, though none have been fully realized or implemented.175
“flawed mechanism for analysis by courts,” the presumption against extraterritoriality “remains
valuable”).
171.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 201(2), pt. II,
ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“In exercising jurisdiction to prescribe, the
United States takes account of the legitimate interests of other nations as a matter of prescriptive
comity.”).
172.
Baquizal, supra note 119, at 1564-65.
173.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 204 & § 204
cmt. b, pt. II, ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“To avoid unreasonable interference with the legitimate sovereign authority of other states, U.S. courts may interpret federal statutory provisions to include other limitations on their applicability as a matter of prescriptive comity.”
“However, application of the presumption does not preclude U.S. courts from interpreting the statute
to include other comity limitations if doing so is consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the
provision.”).
174.
Colangelo & Knight, supra note 95, at 54 (“Under Morrison, therefore, the extraterritorial
reach of a statute is a question of prescriptive, not judicial subject matter, jurisdiction.”).
175.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 190, 231 (proposing a “positive sovereignty principle,” in
which a State can apply their laws to foreign situations if either (1) it has the “strongest nexus” to the
situation or (2) if another State that has the “stronger nexus” fails to adequately deal with the matter
that is harmful to the “regulatory interests of the international community” and the exercise of jurisdiction by the first State “serves the global interest”); see also Ventoruzzo, supra note 87, at 409,
442 (promoting an “effect-only test” to eliminate judicial discretion and preserve flexibility,” while
keeping out situations where the “only contact with the United States is conduct in this country that
exclusively produces effects abroad”); see also Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note
112, at 157 (promoting an exchange-based rule which would provide “valuable certainty as to the
applicable law” and “lead to a socially optimal level of regulation”); see also Marshall, supra note
107, at 219 (recommending that either (1) courts refer to the legislative purpose, not legislative
intent, of the Exchange Act, or (2) Congress amend the Exchange Act to include extraterritorial
effect); see also Young Chang, supra note 39, at 121, 125 (suggesting a narrowed conduct and
effects test that balances the goals of protecting U.S. investors and U.S. markets against “policy
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Nevertheless, the conduct/effects tests are too broad in application, while
Morrison scrutiny is too narrow in scope. Dodd-Frank only added further, and different, confusion among the circuits and district courts. The
goal of the proposed amendment is to provide a simpler basis for courts
in determining when and how to apply U.S. securities laws abroad to
protect U.S. investors, preserve U.S. capital markets, and maintain the
integrity of the territory of the United States, including its global image
and reputation.
IV.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Part IV presents the proposed draft amendment to Section 929P(b), the
significance of which is apparent within its three major variations: (1)
U.S. investors, including U.S. citizens or U.S. residents, will have a private right of action in U.S. courts if the more narrowed conduct/effects
tests are satisfied, which applies to the purchase or sale on either domestic or foreign exchanges; (2) foreign investors on U.S. exchanges may
have enforcement actions brought by SEC/DOJ if no international principles are violated or, if no proceeding is initiated, may petition that the
SEC/DOJ bring such an action if in the best interests of the United States
and it aligns with the goals of the amendment; and (3) foreign-cubed
transactions are properly dismissed, assuming the SEC/DOJ determine
there are no pressing implications on, within, or about the United States.
Aside from the significance of the amendment, the proposed draft addresses the following provisions, thus beginning a new era of securities
regulation: (1) geographic scope; (2) clear statement; and (3) standard.
A.

GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE

While there are strong arguments in support of either subject matter jurisdiction176 or a merits-based approach177 for transnational securities
fraud cases, the Act must reach the substantive transaction of the anissues such as international political harmony and market efficiency”); see also Reuveni, supra note
39, at 1133-34 (proposing that the extraterritorial scope of the securities laws is not properly a matter
of jurisdiction, but rather a question of statutory standing that asks whether “Congress intended for
the relevant statute to reach extraterritorial conduct”); see also David Michaels, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the New Standard of Reasonableness, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 919, 947-48 (1986) (arguing for a standard of reasonableness that
first determines whether the United States is most implicated either because “most of the relevant
conduct occurred there or because most of the effects were felt there” and then, if it is not so clearly
implicated, determine whether a “conflict in relevant regulatory policies or the expectations of the
parties justify accepting or rejecting American jurisdiction”).
176.
See Calhoun, supra note 27, at 726 (arguing that a broader scope of subject matter jurisdiction should be adopted in transnational securities fraud cases because it better “comports with the
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tifraud provisions of the Exchange Act to achieve the most advantageous
results. The Supreme Court’s decision in Arbaugh noted the complexities of jurisdictionally and non-jurisdictionally worded statutes.178 Its
analysis is instructive:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with
the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non-jurisdictional in character.179
As it currently stands, Dodd-Frank is purely jurisdictional because Congress “affirmatively includ[ed] the issue in subject-matter jurisdiction
provisions,” making the language “not a drafting error”180 under the
Arbaugh explanation. Instead, it is a matter of prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction, meaning the geographical reach of the statute establishes the cause of action.
Amending the statute to delete the present jurisdictional references and
include the geographic and substantive reach of the antifraud provisions
of the Exchange Act is consistent with prior case law181 and the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law: Jurisdiction, Tentative Draft.182
remedial purposes of the federal securities laws” and “allows victims of transnational securities
fraud to have access to federal courts without having to prove the merits of their claims first”).
177.
See Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 83 n.8 (2009) (in rejecting an argument for subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court
referred to the statute at issue and stated that “neither provision speaks in jurisdictional terms or
refers in any way to the jurisdiction”); see also Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., 523 F.3d 1353,
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that when there is no indication that Congress intended the extraterritorial limitations on the scope of the statute to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts,
“the issue is properly treated as an element of the claim which must be proven before relief can be
granted, not a question of subject matter jurisdiction . . .“).
178.
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-15 (2006).
179.
Id. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
180.
Painter, supra note 96, at 204 (“The statutory language thus turns the extraterritorial issue
into a question of jurisdiction rather than of the merits . . . .”).
181.
See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004) (interpreting extraterritoriality of the statute based on legislative acts and the “rule of construction” in accordance with the principles of customary international law and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law section 403 regarding the limits on prescriptive jurisdiction and acknowledging the
“legitimate sovereign interests of other nations” in “today’s highly interdependent commercial
world” with consideration that such application of U.S. law to foreign conduct be “reasonable” and
“consistent with principles of prescriptive comity”).
182.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION §§ 201(3), 20305, pt. II, ch. 1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“If the geographic scope of a federal
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Such an approach makes sense since a presumption cannot be used in the
first place where the statute does not reach substantive conduct.183
B.

CLEAR STATEMENT

Congressional intent to apply provisions extraterritorially must be explicitly stated. If Congress reflects its clear intent in the text of the statute,
the Supreme Court and the lower courts would be bound to follow the
will of Congress and would have to apply the new standard in cases
involving the antifraud provisions brought by private U.S. claimants or
proceedings initiated by the SEC/DOJ.
C.

STANDARD

A modified conduct/effects tests should be reinstated only for actions
brought by SEC/DOJ and U.S. citizens/residents; Morrison’s transactional test should be abolished. The standard will cover the following
details: the private right of action, the distinction between a U.S. investor
and foreign investor, the importance of the responsibilities of the SEC/
DOJ, the significance of respect for other sovereigns, and the maintenance of a strong international presence, while aiming to achieve a sustainable-domestic-integrity standard.
1.

The Private Right of Action

The amendment should extend to private parties only if they are a U.S.
citizen or U.S. resident. Private U.S. investors should not be prevented
from bringing a claim against a foreign issuer and should not be limited
to relief only when they buy/sell on domestic exchanges or other domestic transactions. The risk of foreign issuers escaping U.S. liability and
deceiving U.S. investors will be greatly reduced under the proposed
amendment.
The plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship or U.S. residency should be more important than the location of the transaction and a codification should embody
this notion. Claimants under this category will also have a higher burden
law is not clear, federal courts apply the principles of interpretation set forth in §§ 203-205,” which
directs courts to the following: “Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,” “Reasonableness in Interpretation,” and “Interpretation Consistent with International Law.”).
183.
Id. at § 203 cmt. a, pt. II, ch. 1 (“The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to
substantive provisions of federal statutes. The presumption does not apply to provisions granting
subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts.”); see also RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 71 (“[T]he
presumption against extraterritoriality only applies to substantive statutes . . . and not to jurisdictional statutes, which are supposed to govern their own territorial scope.”).
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than proceedings brought by the SEC/DOJ to avoid frivolous lawsuits
and save judicial resources.
The change expresses a strong U.S. interest in its own investors and markets by providing only U.S. citizens/residents with a private right of action under the antifraud provisions, while leaving any remaining action
to the sound judgment of the SEC/DOJ.184 Additionally, deferring to the
reasonable construction of an administrative agency in discerning a silent
or ambiguous statute has long been a part of our jurisprudence in determining whether deference is or should be required.185
2.

U.S. v. Foreign Investors

Foreigners should not be able to bring a claim against a foreign issuer for
foreign shares using the laws of the United States as opposed to their
own country, since it may have serious foreign relations concerns and
harm international efforts at cooperation and harmonization. A limit in
this respect will avoid the potential abuse from the private right of action
of foreigner investors or from global class action lawsuits. Private foreigners must rely on the laws of their own country, with the hope that
these countries will in turn become more involved in the enforcement
proceedings and the securities regulation within their own borders.
3.

The Responsibilities of the SEC/DOJ

The proposed amendment does provide an opportunity for the foreign
investor to seek U.S. relief. Foreign plaintiffs can petition the SEC/DOJ
to take on their case. In turn, the SEC/DOJ may accept or decline after
weighing competing concerns. This process prevents the potential of infringement on another sovereign’s territory/nationals and guards against
184.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (stating that
“private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement” to enforcement proceedings brought by the SEC and DOJ, but cautioning that “[p]rivate securities fraud actions, however, if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs
on companies and individuals . . .”); see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)
(stating that private rights of action under the securities laws are a “necessary supplement to Commission action”).
185.
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (noting that the question for the court is whether the agency gave a permissible construction);
see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 201 cmt. e, pt. II, ch.
1 (Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (defining administrative interpretations and requiring
deference with a reasonable agency construction); see also RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 100 (noting
that where the reasonableness analysis reveals that another State has a more legitimate jurisdictional
case, “the former State may want to, or have to, defer”).
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the unjustified prevalence of foreign-cubed transaction where the United
States has very little interest.186
There may be instances where it is better for the United States to “positively assert jurisdiction,” rather than “refrain from exercising jurisdiction.”187 For example, if the SEC/DOJ determines there is a significant
U.S. interest at stake, it is possible that not even a forum non conveniens
argument will prevent U.S. law from applying extraterritorially,188 even
though it is typically invoked in foreign-cubed transactions.189 In conclusion, if the SEC/DOJ reasonably determines that the conduct or effects within the United States falls within the standard outlined by the
proposed amendment, they can bring the enforcement action against the
foreign issuer.
4.

Respecting Other Sovereigns and Maintaining International
Presence

Under a sustainable-domestic integrity standard, the SEC/DOJ would be
vested with the discretion to weigh competing factors and determine if
domestic adjudication over the dispute is in best interests of the United
States. Among such factors include analyses of comity, reasonableness,
and deference. Overall, this standard is a higher burden than the conduct/effects tests, but not as overly burdensome and limited as Morrison.
The proposed amendment strives to increase global cooperation and motivate foreign nations to become involved in policing efforts and negotiations with United States, with a vision of serving as a significant step
toward a multi-national treaty agreement on extraterritoriality in securities law.
186.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 87, at 407 (noting that the “conduct-effects approach excessively expanded the scope of the securities laws to cover transactions that the United States had little
interest in regulating”); see also Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud, supra note 112, at 144
(finding that foreign-cubed transactions are “predicated on transactions having little to do with the
United States”).
187.
RYNGAERT, supra note 9, at 44 (noting that there may be a “positive responsibility” to
assert jurisdiction under a “more modern conception of international law as a law of cooperation”).
188.
See In re Corel Corp., Secs. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (rejecting a
forum non conveniens argument based on the United States’ “local interest” in maintaining the
integrity of U.S. markets and protecting U.S. investors and the fact that domestic courts may be
“more congested” than the alternative foreign court is irrelevant since the case can be adjudicated
“without undue administrative difficulties”).
189.
See EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS, supra note 55, at 373 (noting that
foreign-cubed cases – involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign law - are likely
candidates for a forum non conveniens dismissal).
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The Sustainable-Domestic-Integrity Standard in the Amendment

After considering these factors, the proposed wording of Dodd-Frank,
Section 929P(b) would appropriately be re-drafted as follows, emphasis
added to reflect the above reasoning:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION: Sustainable-Domestic-Integrity – The district courts of the United States and
the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction
and the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act shall apply
to and geographically reach any person under this title dealing
with a fraudulent transaction in any proceeding, in law or equity, brought by –
(1) A citizen of the United States and/or resident of the
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions
which apply under this Act, involving –
(a) material conduct occurring within the territory of the
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation for which irrevocable liability 190 is
incurred, even if the securities transaction occurs outside
the United States and involves a claim against domestic
and/or foreign issuers; or
(b) material conduct occurring outside the territory of the
United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect
within the United States for which is reasonably likely to
prevail.
(2) The Commission or the United States initiating an enforcement proceeding either against a domestic and/or foreign issuer or on behalf of a request of a domestic and/or
foreign investor alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this Act involving—
(a) conduct within the territory of the United States that
constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United
States and involves a claim with domestic and/or foreign
issuers and/or investors, for injury reasonably likely
upon –
(1) U.S. investors;
(2) U.S. capital markets; or
(3) the integrity of the territory of the United States; or
190.
“Irrevocable liability,” as adapted from the standard articulated in Absolute Activist Value
Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012).
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(b) conduct occurring outside the territory of the United
States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States, for injury reasonably likely upon –
(1) U.S. investors;
(2) U.S. capital markets; or
(3) the integrity of the territory of the United States; or
– for which the Commission or the United States makes a
reasonable judgment that such proceeding does not harm
the interests of a foreign sovereign, which may under certain
circumstances have a greater interest, and is consistent with
modern international law principles including, but not limited to, comity, reasonableness, and deference; cases for
which U.S adjudication may impair these principles at the
reasonable judgment of the Commission or the United States
will be dismissed, absent compelling circumstances to the
contrary.

V.

APPLICATION IN A NEW ERA

For Part V, the hypothetical at the beginning of this study will be revisited. With the proposed amendment, Morrison is effectively nullified;
thus, courts would be faced with the new provisions outlined in the
amendment. First, the amendment does not contain jurisdictional language and specifically outlines that it reaches the substantive provisions
of the Act. In fact, the text specifically reads “the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act shall apply to and geographically reach . . . .” Second, there is clear indication of congressional intent to apply the U.S. law
extraterritorially, which is evidenced in the title, “Extraterritorial Application.” Lastly, courts will use the sustainable-domestic-integrity standard, which is a higher standard than the conduct/effects tests, but not as
narrow as the transactional test.
In the hypothetical, because the proceeding is brought by the SEC/DOJ,
courts would analyze the complaint under the sustainable-domestic-integrity standard by following the elements in the statute to see if it states
a cause of action; for example, if there is “conduct . . . in furtherance of
the violation” or “conduct . . . that has a foreseeable substantial effect”
for “injury reasonably likely” to “U.S. investors,” “U.S. capital markets,” or “the integrity of the territory of the United States.” If these are
insufficiently alleged, the claim will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, because it is
the SEC/DOJ bringing the claim, they are usually given more deference
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and, because of their position, have a lower burden of proof than private
U.S. claimants.
Thus, there are no longer two different standards to apply, only one. Because of the substantial fraudulent conduct occurring in the United States
and direct harm to U.S. investors, courts can reasonably find that extraterritorial application would be appropriate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In considering modern securities laws, the advancement of technology in
global business transactions, and the basic principles of international law
– including comity, reasonableness, and deference – extraterritoriality
will continue to be of great significance. The optimal approach to a
clearer, more consistent standard in determining the extraterritorial reach
of the antifraud provisions of U.S. securities laws is to amend DoddFrank by codifying a modified and more restrained version of the conduct/effects tests in which courts would look to prescriptive jurisdiction
under international law to discern congressional intent and, upon a finding of clear congressional indication from the text and additional tools of
statutory construction, employ no presumption at all, absent other compelling reasons to refuse jurisdiction.
The sustainable-domestic-integrity standard would geographically reach
the substance of the transaction, provide a clear indication of the express
will of Congress, and create a standard that promotes the private right of
action for U.S. claimants, maintains healthy foreign relations with other
sovereigns, and leaves the remaining claims to the reasonable judgment
of the SEC/DOJ. It is an important stepping stone designed to increase
enforcement efforts and harmony among the international community
and pave the way for a multi-lateral treaty agreement on extraterritoriality in securities regulation.
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APPENDIX A
PRE-MORRISON CASE LAW
While the territoriality principle was premised on the “law of nations” in
early cases, modern cases do not even reference international law but
instead seek to ascertain the intent of Congress.1 The presumption
against extraterritoriality provides that where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts begin with the presumption that Congress intended the law to
apply only within the United States and then “search for disconfirming
evidence.”2
In the early nineteenth century, courts put great emphasis on the territoriality principle.3 Traditionally, a nation’s laws can only be enforced if the
violation took place within the nation’s sovereign territory. Federal law
applied only within the “full and absolute territorial jurisdiction” of the
United States4 and had “no force to control the sovereignty or rights of
any other nation.”5 This era was characterized by tying the presumption
to the restrictions imposed by international law, not to congressional intent.6 Domestic courts have usually, though consistently, refused to apply U.S. law to conduct that occurred on foreign territory.7 In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts continued this approach.8
By the twentieth century, territorial jurisdiction started to expand. Domestic courts took a more flexible approach to the “principle of territorial
exclusivity” in which courts have occasionally agreed to regulate disputes involving both U.S. and foreign conduct.9 The most common and
agreed upon reason for this flexible approach was the rising power of the
United States relative to European states between the war.10
Beginning in the area of antitrust regulation, legislation was “prima facie
territorial” with a limited scope11 before judges broadened their approach
to include U.S. adjudications of foreign agreements in restraint of trade,
1.
2.
RIALITY

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2d ed. 2015).
TONYA L. PUTNAM, COURTS WITHOUT BORDERS: LAW, POLITICS, AND U.S. EXTRATERRITO267 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).
Id. at 67.
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812).
Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
See RYNGAERT, supra note 1, at 67.
See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 20.
See RYNGAERT, supra note 1, at 68.
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 21.
Id.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
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such as monopolies.12 Nevertheless, courts always started with the assumption that “Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions.”13
Around the mid-twentieth century, courts began to “shred the strict interpretation of territoriality.”14 This shift did not produce any sudden
changes in U.S. jurisprudence; U.S. approaches to extraterritoriality took
a more gradual approach, as U.S. law aimed towards social and civil
rights was not as significant as extraterritoriality in the “economic
sphere.”15 The presumption “fell into complete disuse in the post-1945
era only to be subsequently “revived following the end of the Cold
War.”16
While Kook v. Crang marked the first case to consider the extraterritoriality of securities laws (though dismissed),17 it was not until 1963 that
extraterritorial application was successful. This application was justified
due to the need to “prevent fraud in the sale of securities and to minimize
or prevent losses to investors.”18
The effects developed before the conduct test. The effects test required
that foreign conduct injure U.S. investors, making extraterritorial application “necessary to protect American investors.”19 However, action in
the United States was not necessary when jurisdiction is “predicated on a
direct effect,”20 though courts have sometimes considered “international
comity and fairness” before applying domestic law abroad.21 Throughout the years, courts have relied on additional factors such as the “adverse impact on domestic securities markets,”22 “aiding and abetting a
deception,”23 and other aspects “largely based upon policy considerations”24 in analyzing extraterritoriality under the effects test.
12.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
13.
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
14.
RYNGAERT, supra note 1, at 68.
15.
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 23.
16.
Id. at 267.
17.
182 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
18.
Securities & Exchange Com. v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 996
(S.D. Fla. 1963).
19.
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
20.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991 (2d Cir. 1975).
21.
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir.
1976).
22.
Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1977).
23.
IIT, International Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 918 (2d Cir. 1980).
24.
Continental Grain (Australia) Pty., Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 416 (8th
Cir. 1979).
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The conduct test required that the conduct in the United States constitute
the “essential link” in the perpetration of the fraud; for example, that
“substantial misrepresentations were made in the United States.”25
Bersch and Vencap, adjudicated on the same day, decided that more than
“merely preparatory activities in the United States” is required,26 while
the “perpetration of fraudulent acts” is sufficient.27 Judge Friendly in
Bersch articulated a three-tiered test on the antifraud provisions of the
1934 Act in foreign securities: (1) American residents in the United
States must show acts of “material importance” occurring in the United
States; (2) American residents abroad must show acts of “material importance” occurring in the United States that “significantly contributed” to
the fraud; and (3) foreigners must show actual fraudulent acts that “directly caused” their losses.28
Thus, up to this point, courts have incorporated policy justifications in
their opinions, namely, the protection of American investors and the protection and integrity of U.S. security markets. However, this scope of this
approach was greatly expanded in Kasser.29
In Kasser, the Court moved away from the mere prepatory to substantially material continuum of Bersch and Vencap and developed a quantitative approach that justified series of policy considerations.30 Although
the fraud had little to no direct impact on American investors, the Court
found jurisdiction based on the defendant’s activities carried out in the
United States.31 This case was a significant extension of securities laws
in the international context because jurisdiction was found despite the
lack of domestic impact and little domestic conduct. It was justified on
the theories of protecting American investors by enforcing high standards of regulations and preventing America from turning into a “ ‘Barbary Coast’ . . . harboring international securities ‘pirates.’ ”32 In
addition to the goals of protecting American investors and U.S. markets,
the opinion closes with the court’s additional policy justification to ensure the “high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this
25.
1972).
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335, 1337 (2d Cir.
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992.
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 116.
Id. at 110, 115.
Id. at 116.
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country in addition to protecting domestic markets and investors from
the effects of fraud.”33
Changes to the U.S. extraterritoriality approach began occurring in the
1980s and 1990s.34 The Second Circuit soon became the nationwide
leader at securities litigation, with other circuits adopting the same approach or formulating different approaches; for example, simply because
they “feel constrained to do likewise.”35 The D.C. Circuit was the most
restrictive circuit, requiring that the domestic conduct comprise “all the
elements of a defendant’s conduct necessary to establish a violation of
section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5.”36
History demonstrated that the “presumption against extraterritoriality”
has been inconsistent and uneven at first, and then almost completely
disregarded in later decades.37 Throughout the 1990s, the Supreme
Court continued to reaffirm the presumption against extraterritoriality despite opposing arguments. In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court “revived a robust version” of the presumption after decades of not using it.38
The Supreme Court has noted that the presumption against extraterritoriality is a longstanding principle of American law and that Congress is
primarily concerned with domestic decisions.39 Such an analysis is a
matter of statutory construction and if Congress wishes to apply a statute
extraterritoriality, it could amend the statute.40 In this era, the Supreme
Court put forth a strict approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality, indicating that a clear statement of Congress’s affirmative intention
in the statute’s text was necessary to overcome the presumption.41
The U.S. courts, even the Supreme Court, began to favor a “case-bycase” approach.42 However, there were still great debates and inconsistencies regarding the use of the presumption.43 While the Supreme Court
held in 1993 that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially to foreign
conduct and was not subject to the presumption, despite Justice Scalia’s
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (emphasis added).
See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 23.
AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Inv. Pshp., 740 F.2d 148, 153 (2d Cir. 1984).
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 23.
Id. at 267.
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
Id. at 248, 259.
Id. at 248.
See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 24.
Id.
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dissent to the contrary,44 it moved away from this position about ten
years later, concluding that “independent foreign harm” is not covered by
the Sherman Act.45 Thus, the Supreme Court has regarded the presumption as “a critical factor” in prior cases and “conspicuously ignored” it in
later cases.46
Nevertheless, Section 10(b) claims moved forward where the fraudulent
scheme was “masterminded and implemented” in the United States47 or
“(1) significant and (2) substantial or material to the larger scheme.”48
This confusion paved the way for Morrison’s reasoning.
Under modern U.S. law, territoriality is not grounded upon international
law, but rather based on “Congress’s primary concern with domestic
conditions.”49 This rationale is demonstrated in Morrison as well. The
opinion contains few references to international law or comity; conversely, it is “centered almost entirely on ascertaining the intent of the
U.S. Congress.”50 Questions regarding how, when, and if domestic laws
apply extraterritorially will increase in both “frequency and in importance in contexts beyond the United States.”51
PRE-MORRISON CIRCUIT SPLIT
The following chart represents the three-way circuit split that existed
prior to Morrison. Each group of circuits have articulated specific formulations for determining the extraterritoriality of U.S. securities laws,
with each test grounded on different criteria. Michael J. Calhoun nicely
categorizes the three-way split among the “Restrictive Conduct Approach: Actual Violation;” “Broad Conduct Approach: Lesser Quantum
of Domestic Conduct;” and “Balancing Conduct Approach: Higher
Quantum of Domestic Conduct.”52

44.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 796, 814, 818-20 (1993).
45.
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004).
46.
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 24.
47.
SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2003).
48.
In re Cable & Wireless, 321 F. Supp. 2d 749, 763 (E.D. Va. 2004).
49.
RYNGAERT, supra note 1, at 68.
50.
Id. at 85.
51.
PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 277.
52.
Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 679, 698, 700, 708 (1999).
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Pre-Morrison Circuit Split → The “Conduct/Effects” Tests
Restrictive Application

Broad Application

Balanced Application

D.C. Court of Appeals

Third, Eighth, & Ninth Circuits

Second, Fifth, & Seventh Circuits

D.C. Circuit: The
domestic conduct alone
must constitute an actual
violation of the securities laws by satisfying
all the elements for a
cause of action under
Section 10(b) and Rule
53
10b-5.

Third Circuit: At least some
activity that relates to the transnational fraud scheme must occur in
54
the United States.

Second Circuit: Courts have jurisdiction
where there is “substantial and material
activity” and the antifraud provisions may
regulate transactions that occur on foreign
markets or that involve securities not reg57
Eighth Circuit: In a transnational istered under the Exchange Act.
fraud case, there must be “signifi- Courts have also applied a multi-factoral
cant conduct” in the United States approach in determining the extent to
regarding the alleged wrongdowhich U.S. federal securities laws will
55
58
apply to transnational transactions.
ing.

Ninth Circuit: The conduct at
issue must be more than merely
preparatory; the execution of an
agreement in the United States will
weigh in favor of U.S. jurisdic56
tion.

Fifth Circuit: Jurisdiction “turns on the
facts” in transnational securities fraud
59
cases; where events occurring in the
United States are the “key events,” juris60
diction may be proper.
Seventh Circuit: Articulated the “balancing approach” that required that the conduct occurring in the United States
constitute a “substantial part” of the fraud
61
and be “material to its success.”

POST-MORRISON CASE LAW
Judicial decisions following Morrison have been anything but consistent.
Not only do courts discern congressional intent, but now they must discern Morrison’s legacy. Despite these shortcomings, there have been
several less complex cases following Morrison. For example, lower
courts have held that the purchase of foreign shares on a foreign ex53.
Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Calhoun, supra note
52, at 698.
54.
SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 144 (3d Cir. 1977); Calhoun, supra note 52, at 705.
55.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972);
Calhoun, supra note 52, at 701.
56.
Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983); Calhoun, supra note 52, at
708.
57.
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986, 992-93 (2d Cir. 1975); Calhoun, supra
note 52, at 710-11.
58.
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1975); Calhoun, supra note 52, at
712.
59.
MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1990); Calhoun, supra
note 52, at 716.
60.
Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 907 (5th Cir. 1997);
Calhoun, supra note 52, at 714.
61.
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998); Calhoun, supra note
52, at 719.
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change electronically from the United States is insufficient to maintain a
cause of action against a foreign defendant.62
The same reasoning also applies to the holding that securities listed on a
domestic exchange is not enough; the transaction must actually occur on
the domestic exchange.63 Following this analysis, a Section 10(b) action
cannot apply to securities that are cross-listed on domestic and foreign
exchanges where the purchase, sale, and trading do not arise from the
domestic listing.64
A strict presumption against extraterritoriality, which had been revitalized by Morrison, has been extended to foreign-squared transactions65 –
involving domestic investors suing foreign issuers based on a foreign
securities transaction – and criminal liability under Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act,66 so that they do not apply extraterritorially. Furthermore, while some courts have held that domestic securities or domestic
transactions in other securities is “necessary” under Morrison, but “not
alone sufficient” to state a claim under the Exchange Act,67 others have
stated that it is sufficient where the offenses committed abroad violate a
“predicate statute for which the presumption against extraterritoriality
has been overcome.”68
Other cases have not been so simple, especially when courts are faced
with novel fact-patterns and other narrow circumstances that Morrison
could not have contemplated. For example, a transaction on a domestic
“over-the counter securities market”69 that trades via dealers satisfies
Morrison’s first prong (domestic exchanges). Also, a domestic transaction in unlisted securities where the buyer or the seller works with “U.S.
market makers acting as intermediaries for foreign entities”70 satisfies
Morrison’s second prong (domestic transactions in other securities) and
a transaction not traded on a domestic exchange is also domestic under
62.
Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
63.
In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
64.
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
65.
In re UBS Sec. Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106274, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2011).
66.
United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2013).
67.
Parkcentral Global HUB Ltd. v. Porsche Auto. Holdings SE, 763 F.3d 198, 215 (2d Cir.
2014).
68.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (2016).
69.
SEC v. Ficeto, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1107-08 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
70.
United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2015).

https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol23/iss1/5

50

Veneziano: Application of U.S. Securities Law Abroad

2018] APPLICATION OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW ABROAD

129

the second prong if “irrevocable liability is incurred or title passes with
the United States.”71
Cases have been even more troubling where either the parties or the
courts have raised Dodd-Frank concerns. For example, even though irrelevant to its holding, one district court acknowledged that “Congress
explicitly granted federal courts extraterritorial jurisdiction” in DoddFrank,72 while another district court stated that parties should be able to
argue the “possible application of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act.”73
More explicit opinions have noted that Dodd-Frank “may demonstrate
the Congressional intent for the extraterritorial application of certain provisions of the federal securities laws that the Morrison court found lacking”74 and have even declined to resolve the Morrison/Dodd-Frank
inconsistency in cases where the “SEC has stated a claim under either
inquiry.”75 That reasoning demonstrates how complicated this matter
can become when congressional guidance is lacking.
The table below displays when and under what circumstances extraterritoriality was applied under the various tests used by our courts in the past
and how it should be under the sustainable-domestic-integrity standard.
For each example for which it is relevant, assume the following:
Given
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

All investors satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.
The facts would not result in different outcomes
among the pre-Morrison circuit split.
The investors who buy on a foreign exchange do not
meet any criteria to qualify for a domestic transaction
in other securities under Morrison’s second prong.
All private claimants can satisfy their burden under the
applicable standard.
All stock is dually listed.
The issuers are either based in the United States or
abroad.

71.
Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012).
72.
Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 627 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
73.
United States v. Coffman, 771 F. Supp. 2d 735, 737 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
74.
SEC v. Compania Internacional Financiera S.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83424, *19 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011).
75.
United States SEC v. A Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ill.
2013) (referring to Morrison’s transactional test and Dodd-Frank’s conduct/effects tests by the
words “either inquiry”).
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Likelihood of Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws
Conduct/ Morrison’s
Morrison/ SustainableEffects Transactional
DoddDomesticTest*
Test
Frank**
Integrity
U.S. Investor
Private Action?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1. U.S. Transaction
SEC/DOJ?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
U.S. Issuer
U.S. Investor
2. U.S. Transaction
Foreign Issuer
U.S. Investor
3. Foreign Transaction
Foreign Issuer
U.S. Investor
4. Foreign Transaction
U.S. Issuer
Foreign Investor
5. U.S. Transaction
U.S. Issuer
Foreign Investor
6. Foreign Transaction
U.S. Issuer
Foreign Investor
7. U.S. Transaction
Foreign Issuer
Foreign Investor
8. Foreign Transaction
Foreign Issuer

Private Action?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

No

No

Yes

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

No

No

Yes

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No***

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

No

No

No***

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No***

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Private Action?

Yes

No

No

No***

SEC/DOJ?

Yes

No

Yes

No****

* usually sufficient if conduct is more than merely preparatory or at least one U.S. investor harmed
** assuming the court follows Dodd-Frank, not Morrison, in proceedings brought by the SEC/DOJ
*** unless SEC/DOJ takes case on behalf of foreign claimant & international comity not harmed
****unless SEC/DOJ determines risk of harm to the integrity of the territory of the United States
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APPENDIX B
RESULTS OF THE STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION1

OF THE

In Section 929P(b), Congress codified the conduct/effects tests and authorized the SEC/DOJ to bring enforcement proceedings under Section
10(b) in cases involving transnational securities fraud.2 Section 929Y
directed the Commission to conduct a study and solicit public comment
to determine whether a private right of action should be extended.3 This
appendix displays its results and conclusions.
RESULTS OF THE COMMENT LETTERS
CONDUCT/EFFECTS TESTS
Arguments in Favor
of the Transactional
Test4
1. The conduct/
effects tests create
significant conflicts with other
nations’ laws.
2. The conduct/
effects tests result
in costly and abusive litigation.
3. The transactional
test fosters market
growth.
4. The bright-line
standard allows
issuers to reasonably predict their
liability.
5. It respects international comity and
sovereign interests.

Arguments Against
the Transactional
Test5
1. The transactional
test denies U.S.
investors a private
right of action.
2. It creates uncertainty about where
a transaction occurs.
3. It impairs the
ability of U.S. investment funds to
diversify their
portfolios.
4. It forecloses private actions for
foreign transactions listed in the
United States.
5. It arbitrarily disadvantages U.S.
investors compared to foreign
investors.

ON THE

TRANSACTIONAL

Arguments in Favor
of the Conduct/
Effects Tests6
1. The conduct/effects tests promote
investor protection through more
vigorous enforcement of U.S.
securities laws.
2. They draw more
investment to the
United States.
3. They reflect the
economic realities
of modern global
businesses.
4. They ensure that
fraudsters cannot
avoid the reach of
U.S. laws by arranging for the
transaction to occur overseas.
5. They do not harm
international comity.

AND

Arguments Against
the Conduct/Effects
Tests7
1. The conduct/
effects tests impair U.S. relations
with foreign nations because of
the cross-border
extension of U.S.
law.
2. They reduce foreign direct investment in U.S.
markets.
3. They increase
litigation costs.
4. They divert judicial resources of
the United States.
5. The tests are unnecessary, unpredictable, inappropriate, and redundant.

1.
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON THE CROSS-BORDER SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 i (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf.
2.
Id. at 6.
3.
Id. at 7.
4.
Id. at 40-42.
5.
Id. at 42-43, 45, 47-48.
6.
Id. at 49-52.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019

53

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 23 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 5

132

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XXIII

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES BY COMMENT LETTERS
RECOMMENDED BY THE STAFF

AND

ALTERNATIVES

Alternative approaches proposed by the comment letters included the following: (1) “adoption of a conduct and effects tests that are limited to
U.S. resident investors” and (2) “adoption of a fraud-in-the-inducement
test.”8 The staff has also recommended additional options for consideration.9 For the conduct/effects tests, the staff recommended to narrow the
conduct test so that private plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate a
direct injury.10 For the transactional test, the staff presented the following options: (1) permit investors a private right of action for the purchase
or sale of any security that is of the same class of securities registered in
the United States, regardless of the transaction’s location; (2) authorize a
private action against intermediaries that engage in securities fraud while
buying or selling overseas for U.S. investors; and (3) permit a private
right of action if the investor can show that they were induced into the
transaction, regardless of the transaction’s location (a fraud in the inducement test).11
CONCLUSION
The study concluded by noting that securities litigation, whether addressed through “legislation, further judicial developments, or both,” is
still unsettled and “will be subject to further legal development in the
years ahead” and that lower courts will be tasked with the responsibility
to resolve the “difficult issues regarding the application of the new transactional test.”12

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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at
at
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at

53-54.
55, 57.
58.
60-62.
64, 66-68.
69-70.
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